Kelly F. Pearson v. Kimberlee Y. Pearson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Kelly F. Pearson v. Kimberlee Y. Pearson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven H. Gunn; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee; Kellie F. Williams;
Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Intervenor/Appellee.
Paige Bigelow; Kruse, Landa, Maycock & Ricks; Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pearson v. Pearson, No. 20040677 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5161
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KELLY F. PEARSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
PETER D. THANOS, 
Intervenor/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040677-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STEVEN H. GUNN (1272) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS (3493) 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Intervenor / Appellee 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-1162 
PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS 
Attorney for Petitioner / Appellant 
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801) 531-7090 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB - 7 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KELLY F. PEARSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE Y.PEARSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
PETER r XIMUCD, 
ntervenor/Appellee. 
2004067" CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STEVEN H. GUNN(i^2) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
l . j . Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS (3493) 
CORPORON& WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Intervenor / Appellee 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-1162 
PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS 
Attorney for Petitioner / Appellant 
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801^31-7090 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case 2 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below 2 
Statement of Facts 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 20 
ARGUMENT 21 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INTERVENOR STANDING TO 
DISESTABLISH PETITIONER AS ZACHARY'S LEGAL FATHER 21 
A. Schoolcraft Analysis 21 
B. Constitutional Analysis 31 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 47 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION 
AGAINST PETITIONER IN HIS CLAIM FOR CUSTODY OF ZACHARY 52 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTERVENOR CUSTODY 
RIGHTS IN NICHOLAS 59 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT PRIMARY 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF NICHOLAS, AND RESPONDENT AND 
INTERVENOR JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY AND PRIMARY PHYSICAL 
CUSTODY OF ZACHARY 59 
ii 
A. The Court's Designation of Respondent as Primary Physical Custodian 
of Nicholas is Inconsistent With Its Award of 50/50 Physical Custody to 
Petitioner and Respondent and Should be Vacated 60 
B. The Court's Findings are Legally Insufficient to Support its Award of 
Primary Physical Custody of Nicholas to Respondent 61 
1. Finding of Fact No. 38 .......66 
2. Finding of Fact No. 39 67 
3. Finding of Fact No. 40 67 
4. Finding of Fact No. 41 69 
5. Finding of Fact No. 42 69 
6. Finding of Fact No. 46 ......71 
C. The Findings of Fact are Legally Insufficient to Support the Court's 
Award of Joint Legal and Primary Physical Custody of Zachary to 
Intervenor and Respondent 73 
D. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Making Findings Regarding Key 
Factors Relative to the Children's Best Interests in this Case 74 
CONCLUSION 74 
ADDENDUM: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Achumba v. Neustein. 793 So. 2d 1013,1021 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) 36 
Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179 (N.H. 1996) 55 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, fl13,65 P.3d 1134 1,46 
Davis v. LaBrec. 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001) 54, 55 
Dawn D. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 17 Cal. 4th 932,940 (Cal. 1998)...37,39,45 
Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 64 
Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305,309 n.7 (Fla. 1993) 
36 
Dipaolo v. Cugini, 811 A.2d 1053 (Super. Ct. Pa. 2002) 51 
F.B.V.A.L.G.. 795 A.2d 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 57 
Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841, 846 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) 36 
G.F.C. v. S.G. and D.G.. 686 So. 2d 1382,1385 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) 31 
Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) 40 
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978) 35,40,56, 59 
Holder v. Holder, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah 1959) 21,22 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, fl 21,989 P.2d 491 2 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) 52, 53, 54,58,61 
In re Adoption of P.. 252 P.2d 223 (Utah 1953) 35 
iv 
In re Adoption of F., 488 P.2d 130,134 (Utah 1971) 28 
In re Bridget R.. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 37 
In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855,856 (1981) 32 
In re H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 53 
In re J.M. & N.P.. 940 P.2d 527, 539 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 28 
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) 31, 32, 33 
In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189,195 (Tex. 1994) 44 
In re Marriage of Burgess. 13 Cal. 4th 25,45 n.7 (S. Ct.1996) 71 
In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 24, 25,37,46 
In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331,338 (Kan. 1989) 25 
In re Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028,1029-30 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) 51 
In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307. 37 P.3d 1166 35 
In re Shocklev, 123 S.W.3d 642(Tex. Ct. App. 2003) 51 
In re. D.B.S., 888 P.2d 875,887 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) 40,43 
Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436,438 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 2 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) 63 
Kishoaugh v. Kishpaugh. 745 P.2d 1248,1250 (Utah 1987) ..53 
Kristen P. v. Stephen P., N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (App. Piv. 2001) 50 
Kusiorv. Silver, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960) 25 
Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719,727 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 71 
V 
Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983) 34,39,43,44 
Lopes v. Lopes. 518 P.2d 687,691 n.3 (Utah 1974) 42 
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks. 2000 UT 30, U12,996 P.2d 1043 1 
Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172,1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 64 
Michael H. v. Gerald P.. 491 U.S. 110,129 (1989) 38, 39,40,41,44 
Moss v. Moss. CA99-1312 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) 56 
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) ;. 41 
Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services. Inc.. 1999 UT 100 48 
Olwell v. Clark. 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982) 47 
Pennington v. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985) 63,64 
Pusev v. Pusev. 728 P.2d 117,120 (Utah 1986) 61 
Randv A.J, v. Norma I.J.. 677 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. 2004) 51 
Reagan Outdoor Adv.. Inc. v. Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984) 47 
Richard W. v. Roberta Y.. 658 N.Y.S.2d 506,506-07 (App. Div. 1997) 51 
S.D.v.A.G.andJ.G.. 764 So. 2d 807,810 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000 23 
Santoskv v. Kramer. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) 36 
Searle v. Searle. 2001 UT App 367, n.11, 38 P.3d 307 35,57 
See In re H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 913,915 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 1 
Snyder v. Massachusetts. 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934) 38 
StatelnreJ.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 4, 22, 23,26,27,42 
vi 
State in re Walter B.. 577 P.2d 119,124 (Utah 1978) 32 
State v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676,680 (Utah 1997) 48 
Susan H. v. Jack S.. 30 Cal. App. 4«h 1435,1442-1443 (1994) 24 
Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990) 45 
Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 407 P.2d 685,692 n.5 (Utah 1965) 25 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428,434 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 60 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) 28,37 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205,231-233 (1972) 34 
Statutes 
Uniform Parentage Act (2002) 52 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 38 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10 (2004) 61,69 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2) 60 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.1(d) 60 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (2004) 28 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4.12(e) 43 
Other Authorities 
Black's Law Dictionary, at 534 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983) 34 
vii 
Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 17-20 25 
S.B. 14 52 
Unif. Parentage Act § 608 (2002), 37 Fam. Law Q. 5 (Spring 2002) 52 
Rules 
Rule 4-903 of the Utah R. of Judical Admin 61,62 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) 47 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 47 
Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Article I, § 25 31 
viii 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in granting intervenor standing to challenge the 
paternity of the child Zachary born during petitioner and respondent's marriage. Standing is 
a legal issue and is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court. Campbell 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 2001 UT 89, ^  13,65 P.3d 1134. This issue was 
preserved by petitioner's memoranda opposing intervener's intervention (R.83, R.222 & 
R.453). 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment to bar respondent and intervenor from challenging Zachary's paternity on grounds 
of equitable estoppel. The trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness, and no deference is accorded the trial court's conclusions of law. 
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30,1J 12,996 P.2d 1043. This issue was preserved by 
petitioner's motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum (R.1361, R.1302). 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that respondent benefits from the 
parental presumption on her claim for custody of Zachary against petitioner. The trial 
court's determination of what legal standard to apply in a custody case is reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference given to the trial court. See In re H.R.V., 906 P.2d 913,915 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). This issue was preserved by petitioner's trial brief (R.2177). 
l 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in awarding intervenor custody rights in 
Nicholas, respondent primary physical custody of Nicholas, and respondent and intervenor 
joint legal custody and primary physical custody of Zachary. The trial court's custody 
awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, 
U 21,989 P.2d 491. However, the trial court's discretion in custody matters must be 
exercised within the confines of the legal standards set by appellate courts, and the facts 
and reasons for the court's decision must be supported by legally adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Jensen v. Jensen. 775 P.2d 436,438 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
issue of custody was preserved by petitioner's trial brief (R.2177). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third District Court establishing paternity 
of a child of the marriage in a third party, and entering orders regarding custody, child 
support, alimony, and attorney fees. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below 
Petitioner commenced divorce proceedings in December 2000 (R.1). Intervenor 
moved to intervene in the proceedings on January 23,2001, claiming to be the biological 
2 
father of Zachary, one of the uinu.-ui.L... 
respondent filed a motion iucjut'iiliiiii II ul IIHIIIOIN'I fir • Iprlarnrl tn be not the father of 
t.duiji, i'""i i i " iqhta Hfu | in it tn 11| ii irary custody of both children of the 
marriage be awarded to her (P. 3/,. , ~ _rr.sed both motions and requested that 
temporary custody of the children be awarded to him (R cex -iree motions came on for 
hearing before Commissioner Michael ^ ,.. j . ^ «;,; uu„., . i). 
At the hearing, respondent attem, •.-. ' -winner was not 
^LILIK-H'II I i clil Iiiprtpd ' " '• "•{ i_uiu iviaiionoid's Rule, which 
objections were sustained. In the absence of any competent evidence of petitioner's 
nonpaternity, respondent stipulated that custody should continue as it had since the
 ( >' 
separation, namely, upon a 50/50 access schedule w,
 14.4, , ne stipulate ds dtxe^lbJ 
by the court and reduced to ordei (k, I JJ) 
ij11• 11 I 'mil mil i'I'lnn h in'wr-dhi i IIIMIMIII tnintervene(R.165), which 
petition"! ar^m exposed (R.222). The motion was heard August 30, 2001 (R.248). 
Commissioner Evans found that intervenor had not acknowledged his paternity ot Zachary 
for more than two years, though he was aware of and believed himsen . . _j> ; 
biological father, and that intervenor Kepi • i 
other: 7arha-v,n be regarded as petitioner's 
son and to become closely bonded with petitioner during critical stages of Zachary's 
development. Commissioner Evans further found that intervenor had not had substantial 
3 
contact with Zachary prior to the initiation of the litigation, that he had not lived with Zachary 
in the same household or established a parent-child bond with Zachary, that he was 
completely absent from Zachary's life for the first year and a half and had only incidental 
contact with him thereafter, that during intervener's absence Zachary had developed critical 
bonds with his primary caregivers, petitioner and respondent, and that to permit intervenor 
to be introduced as Zachary's father would be disruptive to the child's stability. 
Commissioner Evans concluded that intervenor did not have standing to challenge the 
presumption of paternity in favor of petitioner and that he did not have a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in establishing his paternity of Zachary. The Commissioner's 
findings and recommendation were subsequently reduced to order (R.671). Intervenor and 
respondent objected (R.257, R.400). 
The trial court heard argument on intervener's and respondent's objections on 
December 3,2001 (R.684). After taking the matter under advisement, the court in a 
telephone conference indicated that it felt the issue was governed by the case of State In re 
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), and that the court needed additional information to 
adequately address the policy considerations set forth in that case. Therefore, the court 
appointed Dr. Jill Sanders "to provide the court with an independent 'Schoolcraft evaluation 
(R.728).'" 
Dr. Sanders submitted her "Schoolcraft evaluation" on May 13,2002 (Ex.l-2). She 
stated in the report that "Kelly Pearson functioned as Zachary's father prior to and following 
4 
his birth in September 1999 Zachary identifies ••.....-.... 
is secure, strong and health) '"•"> intervener's contact 
, and that Zachary identifies Peter as 
"Peter' She stated that she "found no information to suggest that Peter's involvement 
in Zachary's life is a disruption to Zachary's normal and positive development K, .... , 
that "[t]here is no research that I am aware ui iiidi o^yco^ navmy i 
figures has a detrimental impac rhanos is 
* ""-ciliated that "psychologically speaking, some 
relationship between a biological parent and their child is necessary for the child's normal 
development." jd. In summary, she opined: "From a developmental and psychological 
perspective, Zachary's functioning is not inherently disrupted by Peter's involvement and 
Peter's relationship with Zachary.. . . ^ u . ^ ! , ...-
development." Id dl '3. 
11| II in n TPIVII it 11 ii ' n mders' report, petitioner requested that Dr. Sanders address 
the impact on Zachary of a disruption in mo established parent-child relationship between 
petitioner and Zachary, which she had not done • -n. .oner also requestea uu., _ . • .-.- • 
address Zachary's present ability to underbid - the 
relevanu •* *^ ^.^n^r^ --^ Quested a 
teleph inference with the court, which was held May 28, 2002 (R.847). The court 
permitted petitioner to outline his concerns in a letter to the court, which he did (R.876). Dr. 
5 
Sanders responded with a letter stating that she intended to address the issues raised by 
petitioner in the custody evaluation and did not deem it necessary to address them in the 
"Schoolcraft evaluation" (Ex. 1-3). 
Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to bifurcate the divorce and to terminate her 
marriage to petitioner, which was granted. The court entered a decree of divorce dissolving 
petitioner and respondent's marriage on June 21,2002 (R.855). 
The district court subsequently requested Dr. Sanders to address the issues raised 
by petitioner. Dr. Sanders did so by letter dated August 26,2002 (Ex. I-4). In this letter, Dr. 
Sanders stated: "Children's reactions to severely restricted or complete loss of contact with 
a loved and trusted caregiver vary dramatically from child to child. It is impossible to predict 
any child's specific response to such a disruption. Reactions may range from mild and 
transient symptoms of grief or depression to severe mood and behavior disruption including 
self-destructive behaviors. Obviously the way to protect Zachary from additional disruption 
is to maintain his relationship with Mr. Pearson." Id. at 2. She went on to state: "I do not 
believe Zachary has 'lost' his relationship with Mr. Pearson. To the contrary, their 
relationship is a strong and positive parent-child attachment. Mr. Pearson's actual time with 
Zachary was disrupted by the separation but has been stable and significant for more than 
two years [since respondent left the marital home]. There is no basis to believe that further 
disruption to the relationship between Zachary and Mr. Pearson is intrinsically linked to Mr. 
Thanos' presence in Zachary's life." Id. at 2-3. Finally, Dr. Sanders stated that "Zachary's 
6 
cognitive ability at the age on; ; , , . ^ .HU'jibU' ••• • ' -
relationship. . ^-e relationships is 
unlikely "h impact on Zachary for quite some time. What Zachary currently 
understands is that he has a loving relationship with Mr. Pearson, whom he considers his 
father and a loving relationship with Mr. T f imos, whom he considers an additional 
caregiver." Id. at 3. Sheendedwitnasiuu,!,*,, ,^.^:^;; , . • nrtms 
handle zachary's intellectual un<•• -• »• -'qtionship ••• " * • - ~ r i ' wavthat 
- - ' — • IP adopted child's circumstances." Id. 
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion requesting that the court set the matter for 
evidentiary hearing (R.869). In a telephone scheduling conference >=-. - ..• ,, <_uu2, 
the court summarily denied petitioner's request and set the nidllei lui out..' limn oi.il 
argument Octobei 
vhich no evidence was taken, the court 
granted intervener's motion to intervene (R.89*i, >...yi, conclusions and an order were 
signed over petitioner's objection on November 7, 2002 (R.933, R.975, R.971). 
The following week, intervenor filed a motion fo. partial summary judgment 
requesting that he be declared "llu: l/iulinjn .il ml ii.ihif.il l.illi.-i n\ ?;\r\v\\y Andi'pw Prarson 
(R 98! n n HI >n/i 'in II nil'i I hh affidavit in support of the motion, attaching genetic test results 
' alleging sexual relations with respondent (R.1000). Intervenor did not allege that it was 
in Zachary's best interests for petitioner to be disestablished as Zachary's legal father and 
7 
made no argument or reference to Zachary's best interests, except to state that "issues in 
regard to standing have already been addressed by this court and need not be readdressed 
in this context as they are the law of the case (R.992, at 5)." 
Petitioner objected to the admissibility of the genetic test results attached to 
intervener's affidavit and moved to strike the report (R.1298). Thereafter, petitioner filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that intervenor and respondent 
were equitably estopped from challenging Zachary's paternity (R.1361, R.1302). Petitioner 
also filed a memorandum responding to intervener's memorandum arguing, inter alia, that 
paternity should not be established absent a best interests hearing (R.1302). Intervenor 
and respondent filed separate memoranda responsive to petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment, each claiming, inter alia, that Zachary's best interests mandated that intervenor 
be declared Zachary's father (R.1376, R.1427). 
Petitioner filed a reply (R.1598) and the affidavit of Douglas Goldsmith, Ph.D. 
(R.1592), disputing the claim that Zachary's best interests mandated that intervenor be 
declared Zachary's father. Dr. Goldsmith noted that the parent-child relationship involves a 
unique empathy between parent and child that develops most crucially between 9 months 
and 15 months of age, and that by the age of 18 months, a child has a fully formed 
conception of who his parents are. Id. at 3. Dr. Goldsmith took particular issue with Dr. 
Sanders' opinion that it is necessary for a child's normal development to have a relationship 
with his biological parents, stating, rather, that it is crucial to the child's normal development 
8 
to have a healthy and undisrupted relationship with his parent, who is defined as the person 
with whom ,!,ov.; - iild relationship '-1 i i ^ . 
Inlfiveii','i'\ iiK'li"ii I'M- summary it, petitioner's cross-motion for summary 
judgment, and petitioner's objection to the admissibility of the genetic test results were set 
for oral argument March 5,2003 (R.16581 A r i"r argument, the court took the matter, 
advisement and on Marc ^UuJ ibbUcu HO I K i l l IVJ * i . I ' ^ 
ne coun grantee . -•* T 
1
 • -•- t and objection to the admissibility of the genetic 
In subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law entered over 
petitioner's objection (R.1684, R.1723), the court concluded that intervenor had established 
his paternity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that the presumpuu s 
Zachary's father had therefore bee,. ... ' •" 
' ^ "
n ne based upon ho i 
established that it was in Zachary's best interests to permit intervenor to intervene, and th. il 
the court's findings and order were the law of the case. Id. at 19. With respect to 
petitioner's motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the doctrii 
estoppel is inapplicable to the I >. 1 
UP issues of custody, alimony and 
attorney fees. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court took the matter under 
advisement, subsequently issuing written findings of fact (R. 2434) and entering a 
9 
supplemental decree of divorce (R.2503). The court applied the parental presumption 
against petitioner, denied him legal custody rights in Zachary, awarded primary custody of 
Zachary to respondent and intervenor, awarded primary custody of Nicholas to respondent, 
and granted respondent's request to relocate with both children to the State of Oregon. At 
the same time, the court found that it was in the children's best interests that there be a 
"joint physical custody arrangement" between the petitioner on the one hand, and 
respondent and intervenor on the other, consisting of a 50-50 custody schedule for 
Nicholas, and a somewhat less than 50-50 physical custody schedule for Zachary. The 
schedule was made contingent upon petitioner relocating to Oreogn. The court awarded no 
child support, alimony or attorney fees. 
Statement of Facts 
Petitioner and respondent were married in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 17,1992 
(R.2434, at 2, U1; R.2532, at 388:24). They met while both students at the MBA school at 
Brigham Young University (R.2532, at 387:14) and married after completing their first year. 
Id. at 389:1-12. Upon graduating in April of 1993, they both obtained jobs with Hewlett-
Packard in Corvallis, Oregon, and moved there in June of 1993. id. 390:1-5. 
Respondent quickly advanced in the company and was promoted to a management 
position approximately 18 months later, id- 391:17 — 392:21. Over the next few years her 
responsibilities continued to increase. Id. 394:12 - 395:19. 
10 
The parties' first son, Nicholas, was born July 6,1997 (R.2434, at 2, U1). By this 
time, respondent had risen to the position of joint fab manager (R.2532, at 395:20). She 
worked long hours, sometimes until 3:00 a.m. and on weekends. Id. 394:12 - 396:4. She 
did not change her work habits after Nicholas's birth, and frequently was at work by 8:00 
a.m., not returning until 7:00 p.m. and sometimes later, 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. ]d. 396:18 -
398:11. She also worked on her days off during the week and on weekends. Id. 
Conversely, petitioner made substantial changes in his work schedule and habits to 
accommodate Nicholas's birth, jd. 396:5 - 399:7. He switched to a four-day work week, 
did not work weekends, and did not work on his days off. He maintained a regular 40-hour 
work week and took care of Nicholas when he was not working. Id. Petitioner was more 
involved in the care of Nicholas than respondent due to respondent's longer work hours, 
greater church responsibilities, and her personal involvements outside the home (R.2533, at 
462:19-463:3). 
Due to a company consolidation, petitioner and respondent moved to Fort Collins, 
Colorado on August 1,1998 and continued their employment there (R.2532, at 405:12). 
Almost immediately upon moving to Fort Collins, a friend of respondent's began recruiting 
her to work for a startup company in Salt Lake City, and petitioner and respondent began 
discussing moving again. Id. at 407:12 - 408:6. Initially petitioner said no, but ultimately he 
agreed to the move, in part because respondent's had been the greater salary. ]d. at 
411:17-412:10. 
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Respondent moved back to Salt Lake City in January 1999 to begin in her new 
position, and petitioner followed over the next several months, transitioning from Fort Collins 
to Salt Lake City. Nicholas stayed partly in Salt Lake City with respondent and partly in Fort 
Collins with petitioner during this transition. Id. 412:11 -419:11 & Ex. P-11. 
Unbeknownst to petitioner, commencing in 1996 and continuing thereafter through 
Nicholas's birth and infancy, and Zachary's conception, respondent was involved , 
romantically with intervenor (R.2533, at 449:15; R.74, fflj 4-6). Intervenor was also married 
at the time, and respondent and intervenor concealed their relationship from their respective 
spouses (R.74, ffij 4-6). Respondent became pregnant towards the end of 1998, and in 
January 1999 she told intervenor that she believed the child was his. Intervenor refused to 
leave his wife and was unwilling to be known or recognized as the child's father (R.2535, at 
961:14-962:25; R.74,1fH 4-6). 
Thereafter, in late March 1999, respondent told petitioner of the pregnancy and of 
the affair. She was four months pregnant by this time (R.2532, at 433:1; R.45, % 4). When 
respondent told petitioner that she was pregnant with Zachary, she stated that she believed 
intervenor was the child's biological father. Petitioner and respondent then discussed the 
viability of their marriage, and respondent stated that she must decide whether to stay with 
petitioner or leave. She asked petitioner whether, if she stayed, he would rear the child as 
his own, making no distinction between him and their older son. Petitioner affirmed that he 
would (R.2532, at 433:12 - 435:2; R.1570, H 4). 
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The following day after this discussion took place, respondent told petitioner that 
she had decided she would stay and make their marriage work (R.2532, at 435:3 - 436:8; 
R.1570, fflj 4-6). From that point forward, until this litigation began, respondent repeatedly 
confirmed to petitioner that she considered him to be the father of the child she was carrying 
and that she would treat him as such in all respects (R.2533, at 450:8 - 452:8; R.1570, 
fflf 4-6). Respondent expressed her fear that petitioner would not do so, and she repeatedly 
asked petitioner for assurance that he would, which petitioner gave. Id. Respondent also 
confided to petitioner that intervenor was unwilling to do anything that would reveal the 
situation to his wife and that he wanted his belief that he was the child's biological father to 
remain secret (R.2533, at 456:5-11; R.1570, U 4). 
Relying on respondent's repeated representations and assurances, petitioner took 
on the commitment of fatherhood and was as involved in the pregnancy as a father can be, 
caring for and supporting respondent, attending all prenatal examinations with her, and 
shouldering increased household duties to relieve respondent during the pregnancy 
(R.2532, at 438:16 - 439:12; R.45, HU 5-8; R.1570,1f 9). 
After Zachary's birth, respondent again resumed her full work schedule, leaving 
petitioner with the lion's share of the responsibility for the children (R.457:2-6). She had by 
this time been working for several months in the high management position for the startup 
company by which she'd been recruited (R.2533, at 459:14). She worked long hours during 
the week, typically leaving by 8:00 a.m. and not returning until 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. or later. 
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She also worked full days on Saturdays and 4 to 6 hours on Sundays, jd. at 457:1-15. 
She was around even less for Zachary than she had been for Nicholas, jd. at 459:11-23. 
Petitioner, on the other hand, consciously stepped back in his career in order to care for the 
children (R.2532, at 431:1-17). He maintained a schedule of working 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
Monday through Friday, and he did not work over-time or weekends (R.2533, at 457:20 -
458:4). He was involved in all aspects of the children's care. Id. at 458:7 - 459:23. He was 
the one who took Nicholas to school in the morning, and he was the one who would arrive 
home in the evening to relieve the nanny (R.2535, at 1071:11-15). 
Respondent never acted inconsistently with her commitment to petitioner as 
Zachary's father until this litigation began (R.2533, at 452:12). She listed petitioner as 
Zachary's father on his birth certificate. The papers were filled out by both respondent and 
petitioner together after Zachary was born (R.2533, at 453:14 & Ex. P-9; R. 1570,1J 9 & 
1580). Petitioner chose Zachary's given name because respondent had chosen Nicholas's 
given name (R.2533, at 454:4-10). Respondent and petitioner both agreed without question 
that Zachary's surname would be "Pearson" (R. 1570, U10). 
When Zachary was 6 weeks old both petitioner's family and respondent's family 
gathered to bless Zachary as a member of the LDS Church. It was announced that 
petitioner Kelly Pearson, Zachary's father, would give Zachary his name and a blessing, and 
petitioner did so with members of both families participating. After the blessing, respondent 
spoke from the pulpit and expressed the joy that she felt to welcome Zachary into their 
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family. Respondent completed the form for Zachary's Blessing Certificate, signed by the 
Pearson's bishop, stating that petitioner is Zachary's father and that he blessed him (R. 
2533, at 454:11 -455:23 & Ex. P-10; R.1570, U11 & R.1581, R.1582). The Pearson's 
church membership record confirms that Zachary was "bom in the covenant" and is 
therefore sealed to petitioner as his father for all time and eternity (R.1570, H12 & R.1583). 
Even after petitioner and respondent separated and respondent moved from the 
Pearson's marital home in May 2000, she continued to act consistently with her repeated 
representations to petitioner that she considered him to be Zachary's father. She left both 
Zachary and Nicholas with petitioner while she established herself in a new residence, and 
thereafter acquiesced in petitioner caring for both children in the home during the day while 
she worked. She established jointly with petitioner a 50/50 time-sharing schedule to care 
for Nicholas and Zachary, which continued through September of 2004, when the court's 
newly imposed time sharing schedule took effect (R.2434, at 16, If 34.d; R. 1570, fl 13). 
It was not until January 2001, when divorce proceedings commenced, that 
respondent changed her position. At that time she filed a motion with the court asking that 
the court declare that petitioner was not Zachary's father and that he had no rights of 
custody or visitation in Zachary (R.32). 
Nevertheless, while taking this position in court papers, respondent continued to 
represent petitioner as Zachary's father in public forums and to acquiesce in his ongoing 
assumption of the role of Zachary's father. At Zachary's pre-school, which Zachary started 
15 
in the Fall of 2002, respondent listed Zachary's home phone as "Dad - 467-8923", 
petitioner's home phone, and his grandparents as "Velda and Wayne", petitioner's parents 
(R.1570,1f 15 & R.1587). Petitioner is listed as Zachary's father at work, at Zachary's 
school, on the church records, and in this state's vital records (R.1570, U14 & R.1580-91). 
Intervenor also acquiesced in petitioner's assumption of the role of Zachary's father. 
Knowing of Zachary's existence before even petitioner did, and believing himself to be 
Zachary's father from the time he learned of respondent's pregnancy in January 1999, he 
allowed petitioner to assume that role for two full years, doing nothing to acknowledge his 
paternity (R.2535, at 963:1; R.671, fl 9). He felt that he would be "Uncle Pete" to Zachary 
rather than father, yet he acquiesced in that occurring (R.2535, at 964:8-16; R.2536, at 
1302:21 -1303:21; R.449, at 2, fl 4). He kept his biological connection to Zachary hidden 
from others, including his family members, until as late as August 2001 (R. 671, fl 9). 
Despite his belief and knowledge that he was Zachary's biological father, intervenor allowed 
Zachary to be regarded in every way as petitioner's son and to become closely bonded with 
petitioner during critical stages of Zachary's development. ]d. Intervener's desire to keep 
Zachary's parentage secret also resulted in minimal contact between Zachary and 
intervenor during these critical stages (R.2434, at 19). During the first year of Zachary's life, 
intervenor saw him twice, each time about an hour (R.2535, at 964:17-21). During the 
second year of Zachary's life, until February 2001, he saw him two to three times (R.2535, 
at 964:22-25; R.2434, at 4, P ) . 
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On December 25,2000, intervener's wife died (R.2533, at 635:20). Beginning in 
February 2001, intervenor began to have contact with Zachary and Nicholas during the 
periods of time that the children were in respondent's custody (R.2434, at 4, H 9). Zachary 
was seventeen months old by this time. The contact consisted of approximately the 
equivalent of standard visitation for a noncustodial parent (R.2534, at 716:8). Intervenor 
continued to live in Oregon through the time of trial (R.2434, at 4, ^ 8). 
Nicholas and Zachary make no distinction between themselves in their relationship 
with intervenor, identifying him as their step-father and calling him "Pete" (Ex. I-2, at 3; 
R.2535, at 950). To both children, intervenor is a stepparent, not a parent (R.2534, at 
711:17). Nor do Nicholas and Zachary make any distinction between themselves in their 
relationship with petitioner, identifying him as their father and calling him "Dad" (Ex. I-2, at 3; 
Ex. I-4, at 3; R.2434, at 19). Nicholas and Zachary's primary attachment figures are 
petitioner and respondent (R.2534, at 715:11,716:18). They have a "secondary" 
attachment to intervenor (R.2534, at 716:14). 
In May 2001, a few months after the first court appearance in this case, respondent 
voluntarily quit her executive position at the company where she had been working since 
February 1999 and took a position as a contractor working approximately 80 to 85 hours per 
month (R.2536, at 1155:3 -1157:14). Prior to changing positions, she was expected to 
work 50 to 70 hours per week and keep minimum office hours of 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
each weekday (R.762, fl 16). She was also earning a salary of $135,000 per year, plus a 
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bonus of $5,000 (R.1224:8-16). After changing positions, she filed a motion with the court 
requesting that she be relieved of her child support obligation due to having experienced a 
significant decrease in income (R.782, R.762, fl 15). Commissioner Evans denied the 
motion, finding that because resondent's drop in income was voluntary, her support 
obligation should not be decreased (R.848, U 8). 
At the time of trial, respondent was employing a nanny to provide after-care for 
Nicholas and Zachary consisting of, on average, 35 hours per month (Ex. R-9; R.2536, at 
1204:6 -1207:10). This was for time that respondent had the boys with her at her home 
(every other week) and the boys were not in school (R.2536, at 1262:4). Zachary attended 
pre-school until 11:30 a.m., and Nicholas attended first grade until 3:00 p.m. at this time. Id. 
at 1160:16-1161:12. Conversely, petitioner did not employ a nanny, and was able to care 
for the boys personally in his home (R. 2535, at 494:21 - 495:18). He provided care on all 
levels, cooking for them, taking them to school, helping them with homework, educating 
them, playing with them, arranging play dates for them, seeing to their medical needs, and 
participating in their school and extra-curricular activities (R.2533, at 493:1 - 494:20). 
Respondent maintained a home in Salt Lake City through the time of trial (R.2434, 
H 9), but began living partially with intervenor in July 2001, when they purchased a home 
together in Oregon (R.2434, at 4,1J 8). Respondent was still married to petitioner at this 
time. On June 21,2002, respondent obtained a bifurcated decree of divorce from petitioner 
(R.855). Shortly thereafter, respondent and intervenor married (R.2434, at 4,K 7). 
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At the time of trial, Zachary had lived in Salt Lake City his whole life, having been 
born here, and Nicholas had lived here from the time he was approximately 19 months old 
(R.2532, at 412:21 - 415:7). Nicholas was in first grade at Uintah Elementary and Zachary 
was in pre-school at the Jewish Community Center. Id. 487:2-8. In a 4-week period of time 
the boys would spend one extended weekend in Oregon at intervenor and respondent's 
home there (R.2535, at 1074:5 -1075:13). They spent the rest of their time in Salt Lake 
City, either at petitioner's home or respondent's home. Id.; R.2533, at 487:10-16. The 
children enjoyed very close and loving relationships with both sets of grandparents, as well 
as uncles, aunts, and cousins in Salt Lake City (R.485:8 - 487:1; R.2531 at 93:1 -100:18; 
R.2531, at 182:5-187:18). 
At trial, petitioner testified at length regarding why he did not wish to move to 
Portland, including, primarily, that he felt that Salt Lake City was the best place for Nicholas 
and Zachary due to the continuity of neighborhood, school and friends, the extensive family 
network, and the lack of a support network for him in Portland, which could result in the 
children losing him as a co-parent if he were unable to sustain himself there (R.2532, at 
424:5 - 427:12). Additionally, he testified that he felt deeply concerned that respondent 
might choose to move again, even if he did move to Portland. Id. at 427:13 - 429:23. 
Nevertheless, he testified that he would be forced to follow if the court allowed respondent 
to relocate the children because they were the most important thing to him. Id. at 430:23 -
431:22). 
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Zachary and Nicholas have been raised together since birth and have a close, 
loving relationship with one another. Until September 2004, when the court's new custody 
schedule took effect, they had very seldom been separated from one another (R.27, fl 5). 
They are the very best of friends (R. 2434, at 15, fl 34.b). At trial, respondent testified that 
the time apart recommended by Dr. Sanders for the two boys was "more than she would 
like to see." R.2536, at 1211:15-22. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting intervenor standing to establish his paternity of 
Zachary in this divorce action. In doing so, the trial court did not adequately consider the 
policies informing the presumption of legitimacy, including, prominently, the importance of 
swiftly and permanently identifying those persons who will fulfill the parental role for children 
- including marital children. Additionally, the trial court did not identify or weigh the 
constitutional interests at stake in this controversy, which resulted in its erroneous 
conclusion that intervener's rights in Zachary are constitutionally protected, in turn leading to 
the court's over solicitousness of the relationship between intervenor and Zachary. 
The trial court also erred in concluding that equitable estoppel is not applicable to bar 
intervenor and respondent from litigating Zachary's paternity, based on the uncontroverted 
evidence set forth in support of petitioner's motion for summary judgment. 
With respect to custody, the trial court erred in concluding that respondent benefits 
from the parental presumption vis-a-vis petitioner in her claim for custody of Zachary. 
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Petitioner's legal relationship with Zachary (prior to disestablishment by the trial court) 
combined with his in loco parentis status, qualify him as a parent to Zachary and entitle him 
to compete for custody based on a best interests standard. 
The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding primary physical custody of 
Nicholas to respondent. The court's findings are internally inconsistent with respect to this 
award, and legally insufficient to support it. Further, the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding custody rights in Nicholas to intervenor, who was not a contestant for custody of 
Nicholas and did not overcome the parental presumption in favor of petitioner and 
respondent. Additionally, the trial court erred in separating Nicholas and Zachary - an 
award that flows from its improper application of the parental presumption against petitioner, 
and not on best interests findings to support it. Finally, the trial court erred in failing to make 
findings that are legislatively mandated and/or pertinent to the determination of the 
children's best interests in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INTERVENOR STANDING TO 
DISESTABLISH PETITIONER AS ZACHARY'S LEGAL FATHER 
A. Schoolcraft Analysis 
A husband's rights in children born to his marriage have, from ancient times, been 
protected by the presumption of legitimacy. In Holder v. Holder, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah 1959), 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that the presumption "is rooted in the realization of the 
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importance of the integrity of the legally recognized family as the basic unit of society," id. at 
762, and held: "The presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless the contrary is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt The considerations favoring legitimacy render it desirable 
as a matter of policy that the presumption should be accorded the same weight as the 
presumption of innocence." Id. at 763. 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated the continuing importance of the policy 
considerations informing the presumption of legitimacy in State in re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft"). Schoolcraft involved a child, J.W.F., born to Linda Schoolcraft 
after she had been separated from her husband, Winfield Schoolcraft, for seven months to 
one year. Id. at 712. Mr. Schoolcraft became aware of the child's existence when he 
received notice of termination proceedings that had been initiated in the juvenile court. He 
promptly filed a petition for custody of the child. 
Reversing this court's holding that the guardian ad litem for the child had standing to 
challenge Schoolcraft's paternity of him, the supreme court stated that the analysis was 
"insufficiently sensitive to the legitimate policy considerations Schoolcraft raises." Id. at 713. 
The court articulated the policies of "paramount consideration" to be: (1) "preserving the 
stability of the marriage," and (2) "protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary 
attacks upon their paternity." Id. The court concluded: "[W]hether individuals can 
challenge the presumption of legitimacy should depend not on their legal status alone, but 
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on a case-by-case determination of whether the above-stated policies would be undermined 
by permitting the challenge." Id. 
Applying the articulated standard to the facts before it, the court found that the 
marriage between Schoolcraft and J.W.F's mother, who separated long before J.W.F's 
birth, and probably even before his conception, was "one in name only." As to the interest 
in protecting J.W.F., the court found that J.W.F.'s "expectations as to who his father is 
cannot be shaken by permitting a challenge to the presumption of legitimacy. The child has 
never had a relationship with Schoolcraft, [his biological father], or even his mother, so he 
has no expectations as to who his father is." id. 
In the context of this case, the policy of protecting marriage takes on broader 
implications than were present in Schoolcraft. The Pearsons, unlike Mr. Schoolcraft and his 
wife, who lived together for eight months and separated before any children were born or 
likely even conceived of their union, lived together for ten years and jointly participated in 
the rearing of two children together in an intact family unit. Though they have now divorced, 
petitioner and respondent continue to participate in the rearing of two children together in 
separate households. The Pearsons was not a marriage "in name only." 
As noted by the Florida Court of Appeals in S.D. v. A.G. and J.G., 764 So. 2d 807, 
810 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000, "Although divorce may separate and strain a family with children, 
divorce does not end the important child-rearing functions of the family." Thus, the 
presumption of legitimacy protects not only the tranquility of an existing marriage and the 
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legitimacy of children born into a marriage, but also the sanctity of the parent-child 
relationship that develops in the context of marriage. From the standpoint of the child bom 
into a marriage, the protection that is afforded by the presumption of legitimacy does not 
depend on the continued existence of the marriage, but to the contrary, acquires particular 
relevance when the marriage dissolves. Our sister state so recognized in In re Marriage of 
Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), where the court emphasized: "The state's 
interest in applying the [conclusive] presumption [that the husband is the father of children 
born into his marriage] is not limited to assuring adequate support for a child or protecting 
existing marriages from interference. Rather, as we have noted, the state has a well-
recognized interest in preserving and protecting the dignity of parental relationships, 
especially when a marriage is being dissolved and instability is being introduced into a 
child's life." Id. at 448; see also Susan H. v. Jack S., 30 Cal. App. 4* 1435,1442-1443 
(1994)("The state has an 'interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child 
and sibling relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and 
stability.' This interest is served notwithstanding termination of the mother's marital 
relationship with the presumed father."). 
The importance of the marital family as the basic unit of society is grounded in large 
part on the role that marriage plays in nurturing young children. "A child's psychological tie 
to a parent is not a simple, uncomplicated relationship. A child requires from his parents not 
only bodily comfort and gratification, but also demands affection, companionship, and 
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stimulating intimacy. Where these needs are answered reliably and regularly by the parent, 
the child-parent relationship becomes firm, with immensely productive effects on the child's 
intellectual and social development. Where there are changes of the parent figure or other 
hurtful interruptions, the child's vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship become 
evident." See In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331,338 (Kan. 1989) (citing Goldstein, 
Freud. & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 17-20) 
Thus, while genetic testing has become scientifically reliable to the extent that even 
the highest standard of proof required to rebut the presumption can be met, courts have 
nevertheless sustained the mandate of privileging the marital family and protecting children 
from disruption of the relationships developed within it. In California, the courts sustained 
the presumption from the attack that it no longer bore a reasonable relationship to the facts 
sought to be presumed by designating it a substantive rule of law. See In re Marriage of 
Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 ('"A conclusive presumption is in actuality a substantive 
rule of law and cannot be said to be unconstitutional unless it transcends such a power of 
the Legislature.'") (quoting Kusior v. Silver, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960)). This Court has also 
recognized that the presumption of legitimacy is grounded not in considerations of fact, but 
in public policy. See Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 407 P.2d 685,692 n.5 (Utah 
1965) ("[T]he so-called absolute presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is 
based on considerations of public policy rather than absolute certainty as to fact."). 
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Thus, while the Schoolcraft opinion considered a marriage "in name only," the facts 
of this case require the court to consider a marriage in which the partners to the marriage 
jointly reared children together and continue to do so, though the marriage is dissolved. 
The stability of the parent-child relationships that are formed within such marriages are of 
ongoing significance to the well-being of society and as such are entitled to the ongoing 
protection of the state, though the union between the husband and the wife dissolves. 
Moreover, for the state to endorse a policy whereby protection of the parent-child 
relationship ends upon one partner to the marriage deciding to end the marriage - which 
can be done in this state without proof of fault - leaves any husband who lives with a wife 
who has had an affair - whether he knows of the affair or not - vulnerable to having the 
children he rears taken from him without recourse when the marriage ends. Such a policy 
would undermine marriage in general by discouraging reconciliation and/or the formation of 
parental bonds with children of the marriage. 
In this case, the trial court's ruling, if upheld, would indict rather than support 
petitioner - and husbands in similar situations - for attempting to save his marriage. 
Petitioner agreed to attempt reconciliation with his wife, and as part of that reconciliation 
promised to raise the child she had conceived of an affair with another man as his own. 
After having done so, and investing emotionally, financially, and in every other way in the 
child, respondent changed her mind, decided she would rather be with intervenor, and 
asserted that petitioner had no parental rights in the child. The trial court endorsed 
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respondent's assertion, allowed intervenor standing to disestablish petitioner as the child's 
father, and ultimately deprived petitioner of any legal custody rights in the child, allowing him 
only physical access rights as a non-parent "third party". 
If this court upholds the trial court's ruling, any husband who find himself in 
petitioner's position would be foolish to make the choice that petitioner did, knowing that the 
relationship he establishes with the child of the marriage will be at the whim of the wife. 
And, the marital child is left in the uniquely vulnerable position of being in a state of limbo -
without the protection of permanency afforded the non-marital child by adoption statutes, 
and without the protection of permanency traditionally afforded the marital child by the 
presumption of legitimacy. 
The other policy consideration informing the presumption of legitimacy that the 
supreme court identified in Schoolcraft, that of protecting children from disruptive and 
unnecessary attacks upon their paternity, is inter-related with the policy of protecting 
marriage, and as with that policy, takes on broader implications in the context of this case. 
Whereas in Schoolcraft, the child at issue had never had a relationship with Mr. Schoolcraft, 
the child whose paternity is at issue in this case, Zachary, lived together with petitioner, 
respondent and his older brother, Nicholas, for the first nine months of his life, and 
thereafter, lived together with petitioner and Nicholas. By the time intervenor moved to 
intervene, Zachary was 17 months of age. He had formed a strong and secure parent-child 
bond with petitioner and had a fully developed understanding of who his parents were. 
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This state has clearly articulated the paramount importance of ensuring the early and 
uninterrupted bonding of infants with their parents, see Wells v. Children's Aid Society. 681 
P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), and has developed a "swift permanence" policy in both the adoption 
and child welfare context. See In re J.M. & N.P.. 940 P.2d 527,539 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). In the context of children born outside of marriage, the supreme court states: 
It is and should be the policy of the law to so operate as to encourage the 
finding of suitable homes and parents for children in that need. It is obvious 
that persons who might be willing to accept a child for adoption will be more 
reluctant to do so if a consenting parent is permitted to arbitrarily change her 
mind and revoke the consent, and thus desolate the plan of the adoptive 
parents and bring to naught all of their time, effort, expense and emotional 
involvement. 
See id.(quoting In re Adoption of F.. 488 P.2d 130,134 (Utah 1971). Moreover, our 
legislature has found: 
(a) The state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent 
homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption 
of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the 
needs of children; 
(c) Adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive 
placements; 
(d) Adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy 
interest in retaining custody of an adopted child; and 
(e) An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires 
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and 
upon the child's birth 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (2004). 
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In the marital context, it is no less essential to provide children and marital fathers 
with permanence and stability in their parent-child relationships. To adopt a policy that 
would allow the legal relationship between marital fathers and the children of their marriage 
to be disestablished at any time by a blood test is to afford marital fathers less protection 
than prospective adoptive parents, and to afford children born into marriage less 
permanence and stability than children born outside of marriage. Marital children are 
entitled to the same protection and the same permanence in the relationships they develop 
with their parents as are non-marital children. 
In this case, the trial court did not adequately consider the relevant policy 
considerations attending the question of whether the presumption of legitimacy should have 
been allowed to be rebutted. The court refused to take evidence on the issue - while noting 
that "[tjhere is no competent evidence before the court to suggest that allowing Mr. Thanos 
to intervene would be disruptive" - and instead summarily adopted Dr. Jill Sanders' report, 
informed by her unsupported view of the general importance - not to Zachary in particular -
of the biological relationship between parents and children and her speculation regarding 
the future importance to Zachary of his relationship with intervenor. 
While Dr. Sanders may have expertise in custody evaluations, she has no expertise 
in biological versus non-biological relationships between parents and children. Dr. Douglas 
Goldsmith does have this expertise, both from his work as executive director of The 
Children's Center, and his teaching and publishing on attachment theory. See R. 2531, at 
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113:23 -118:15. Had the court permitted an evidentiary hearing before deciding the crucial 
issue of standing in this case, the court would have had the benefit of Dr. Goldsmith's 
expertise. As it was, the court had already disestablished petitioner as Zachary's legal 
father by the time of trial, when Dr. Goldsmith testified that there is no distinction in the 
process of attachment between a biological parent and child on the one hand and a non-
biological parent and child on the other, id. at 120:17-121:13, that it is not essential, as Dr. 
Sanders' opined in her report, for children to have a relationship with their biological parent, 
id. at 160:3-12, that from the child's point of view, the presence or absence of a biological 
tie makes no difference as between caregivers, id. at 160:13 -162:13, and that to a child of 
Zachary's age, the biological tie to a father has no meaning, id. at 163:17 -164:20. 
Further, as a custody evaluator, Dr. Sanders has no expertise in public policy and is 
unqualified to address the paramount concerns that the presumption of legitimacy protects. 
This failure is evident in the court's findings, which fail to address the paramount 
consideration whether disestablishing petitioner as Zachary's legal father (as opposed to 
allowing intervenor to intervene, which is the question that Dr. Sanders answered) would be 
disruptive to Zachary, or whether intervener's untimely interest in developing a relationship 
with his putative son should take precedence over the protection of the established parent-
child relationship between petitioner and his marital son. 
The court erred in failing to conduct a proper standing analysis. A proper analysis 
would have required the court to address the policy concerns set forth above and to take 
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evidence on and make findings addressing those concerns, including, at a minimum, the 
risk to Zachary of losing legal protection in the relationship with the man he knows as his 
father, and the importance to him of having early, permanent and uninterrupted identification 
of those individuals who will function as his parents. 
B. Constitutional Analysis 
Petitioner was Zachary's legal father until he was disestablished as such by the trial 
court. He was not merely a "presumptive" father. "Under any other interpretation, a 
husband could never be more than a presumptive father absent an adjudication of 
paternity." G.F.C. v. S.G. and D.G., 686 So. 2d 1382,1385 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997). 
As Zachary's legal father, petitioner enjoyed all the rights, duties and obligations of a 
parent, and those rights are protected by the Constitution of this state. Article I, § 7 of the 
Utah Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Article I, § 25 ensures that the 
constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained 
by the people." A husband's legal relationship with a child that is born into his intact 
marriage and with whom he establishes an enduring parent-child relationship equal in all 
respects to the relationship he enjoys with other children of his marriage, is undoubtedly a 
liberty interest, as well as an inherent and retained right protected by the Utah Constitution. 
In In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), this Court addressed the constitutionality of 
a statute that authorized the juvenile court to involuntarily terminate a mother's parental 
31 
rights upon finding that it would be in the best interests of her child to do so. Id- at 1374. In 
holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court began by referencing its previous decisions, 
in which the following had been declared: "[T]he ideals of individual liberty which protect the 
sanctity of one's home and family" are "essential in a free society " Id. at 1372 (quoting 
In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855,856 (1981). A parent has a "fundamental right, protected by 
the Constitution, to sustain his relationship with his child." Id- (quoting State in re Walter B., 
577 P.2d 119,124 (Utah 1978)). 
Acknowledging that the Court had not attempted to define with exactness the liberty 
interest guaranteed by the Constitution, nevertheless, it was felt to include, without doubt, 
"the right of an individual to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. 
Addressing those rights retained by the people, the Court stated that "[t]he rights 
inherent in family relationships - husband-wife, parent-child, and sibling - are the most 
obvious examples of rights retained by the people. They are 'natural,' 'intrinsic,' or 'prior' in 
the sense that our Constitutions presuppose them, as they presuppose the right to own and 
dispose of property." Further, "[t]he integrity of the family and the parents' inherent right and 
authority to rear their own children have been recognized as fundamental axioms of Anglo-
American culture To protect the [individual] in his constitutionally guaranteed right to 
form and preserve the family is one of the basic principles for which organized government 
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is established.' 'The family is the basis of our society.' 'The family entity is the core 
element upon which modern civilization is founded.' This primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.'" id. at 1373 (citations omitted). 
The Court went on to address the rights of parents in different circumstances as 
expressed in United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the federal constitution, 
stating: "Parental rights are at their apex for parents who are married. Some variation 
exists among unwed fathers." Id. at 1374. Applying these principles to the case before it, 
the Court emphasized: "The parental liberty right at issue in this case is fundamental to the 
existence of the institution of family, which is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition.'" Id. at 1375 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). It 
was this "rooting in history and the common law" that the Court emphasized "validates and 
limits the due process protection afforded parental rights." ]d. The Court concluded: "For 
the reasons and upon the precedents discussed above, we conclude that the Utah 
Constitution recognizes and protects the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain 
parental ties to his or her child under Article I, § 7 and § 25, and that the United States 
Constitution recognizes and protects the same right under the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments." jd. at 1377. 
The parent-child relationship that is protected by the precedents and reasoning set 
forth in In re J.P. is no less protected because it is grounded in the institution of marriage 
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rather than in biological conception. Nowhere does the Court isolate parenthood from 
family in discussing its inherent and fundamental nature. Now, more than ever, marriage 
and marital relationships are in need of the law's protection. 
Petitioner's relationship with Zachary is a natural relationship in that it does not exist 
by operation of a decree, but rather by virtue of petitioner's assumption of the legal and 
moral obligation to father the children that are born to his marriage, and "'the emotional 
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.'" Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972)). It is by 
no means clear that petitioner is not the "natural" father of Zachary by his acceptance and 
fulfillment of his natural, moral, legal, and socially sanctioned role as husband and father. 
See Black's Law Dictionary, at 534 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983). 
Nevertheless, the relationship can be analogized to an adoptive relationship in the 
sense that it is not a "blood" relationship. In Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 760 (Utah 
1985), this Utah Supreme Court refused to accord any distinction between the parental 
relationship that exists between the legitimated child to his biological father and the adopted 
child to his adoptive mother. The court stated: "The status of an adopted child is in all 
respects identical with that of a natural child. The relationship of the adoptive parent and 
the child is the same legally as that of natural parent and child, with all the rights and duties 
of that relationship. That status remains inviolate irrespective of a subsequent divorce." Id. 
at 763. The Court further noted that "'many parents who have had both natural and 
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adopted children attest that it was impossible to make a distinction between the affection 
they have for the natural and the adopted children."' id. n.2 (quoting In re Adoption of P., 
252 P.2d 223 (Utah 1953). 
In In re S.A.. 2001 UT App 307,37 P.3d 1166, this court held that a father had a 
protected liberty interest both in maintaining the parent-child relationship he enjoyed with his 
child and in maintaining the familial relationship he had with his wife. Id. U14. 
The legal relationship that existed between petitioner and Zachary, created by 
marriage, is worthy of no less deference than the legal relationship of husband and wife, or 
the legal relationship of adoptive parent and adopted child. 
Our case law has also accorded the psychological relationship of parent-child great 
deference and recognized it to be a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of 
our Constitution. See Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64,67 (Utah 1978) (holding that one who 
stands in loco parentis to a child has a constitutionally protected right implicit in the due 
process clause of our state's constitution which "may confer the same rights upon a 
stepparent as those enjoyed by a natural parent."); see also Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 
367, n.11,38 P.3d 307 (citing Gribble for proposition that "[wjhere one stands in loco 
parentis to another, the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words 
imply, exactly the same as between parent and child"). 
Our sister states have recognized that a legal father has a fundamental liberty 
interest in maintaining his filial relationship with his child. See Achumba v. Neustein. 793 
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So. 2d 1013,1021 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) ("[Husband's] due process rights, as [child's] legal 
father were not considered in the pending wrongful death action. The relationship between 
a parent and child is constitutionally protected. As such, that relationship cannot be altered 
or impugned without considering the 'legal father's' due process rights to maintain his 
relationship with the child."); Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841,846 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) 
("[T]he cases have been unanimous in concluding that a parent has a fundamental liberty 
interest in maintaining a familial relationship with a child."). 
Petitioner's legal and psychological relationship with Zachary is entitled to 
constitutional protection. As such, it cannot be terminated by an order declaring intervenor 
Zachary's "natural" father without a clear and compelling reason to do so that carefully 
weighs the competing interests at stake. See Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. 
Privette, 617 So. 2d 305,309 n.7 (Fla. 1993) ("We essentially are dealing with a species of 
termination proceeding when the petition will have the effect of vesting parental rights in the 
putative natural father and removing parental rights from the legal father. We do not see 
how a court constitutionally could apply a standard less than that recognized in Santoskv v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), and other applicable cases where this is true."). 
The trial court abdicated its duty to weigh, or even identify, the interests at stake in 
this controversy and thereby failed in its duty to protect the rights of both Zachary and 
petitioner, which are of constitutional significance. And, contrary to the usual case involving 
a question of constitutionally protected rights, in this case the interests of petitioner, 
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Zachary, and the state are aligned. Petitioner's constitutionally protected liberty interest is 
in maintaining intact his parental rights in his son. Zachary's interest is in maintaining 
undisrupted the legal parent-child relationship that nurtures and sustains him. Cf. In re 
Bridget R.. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (children hold fundamental rights and 
interests in family relationships which are of a constitutional dimension and which do not 
depend on the existence of a biological relationship). The state's interest is in protecting the 
legitimacy of children, protecting the sanctity of relationships that develop within the marital 
family, see In re Marriage of Freeman, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1437,1450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), 
and in facilitating early and uninterrupted bonding of newborns to their parents, see Wells v. 
Children's Aid Society. 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). 
These interests outweigh intervener's countervailing, untimely, interest in asserting 
parental rights in Zachary. 
In determining whether an asserted interest is a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by due process, the interest sought to be protected must first be carefully defined. 
See Dawn P. v. Superior Court of Riverside County. 17 Cal. 4th 932,940 (Cal. 1998). In 
this case, the trial court concluded, without analysis, that "[b]oth the U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions grant Peter Thanos constitutional rights afforded to a natural parent." R.975, 
1f 23. This description of intervener's interest is inaccurate. Intervenor does not claim an 
interest simply as an alleged "natural parent." He claims an interest as the alleged 
biological father of a child born into the marriage of another man who is deemed the child's 
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father by operation of law upon birth. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2. The constitutional 
significance of his claim is therefore distinct from that of other unwed fathers. The 
constitution requires some protection of the biological father's opportunity, which no other 
male possesses, to develop a relationship with his offspring. "Where, however, the child is 
born into an extant marital family, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the 
similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage." Michael H. v. Gerald P., 491 
U.S. 110,129 (1989). Thus, to expand the "liberty" afforded intervenor is to contract the 
equivalent liberty of petitioner, or as Justice Scalia framed it: "[T]o provide protection to an 
adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father." jd. at 130. 
Carefully described, therefore, the interest intervenor claims is constitutionally 
protected is his interest in disestablishing petitioner as the legal father of a child born to 
petitioner's intact marriage, where the child has a fully developed and unquestioned father-
child relationship with petitioner, to have himself declared the father of the child. 
Once the asserted interest is identified, the court must next determine whether the 
interest denominated as a "liberty" is a fundamental right traditionally protected by our 
society and rooted in history, tradition and the conscience of our people. See Michael H. v. 
Gerald P., 491 U.S. 110,123 (1989)("[T]he Pue Process Clause affords only those 
protections 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental"') (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)). Only if the 
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liberty interest is fundamental is it necessary to conduct a complex balancing of competing 
interests. See Dawn P., 17 Cal. 4th at 940-41. 
It is intervener's burden to establish that the interest he has in disestablishing 
petitioner as Zachary's legal father to have his paternity declared is so deeply embedded 
within our traditions as to be a fundamental right. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126. At no 
time has he made any reasoned effort to do so. Nor did the district court articulate the basis 
for its conclusion that intervener's interest rises to the level of a fundamental right. It cannot 
be denied that the plurality of United States Supreme Court did not hold the similar claim of 
a biological father to be of constitutional significance, but instead considered the question of 
whether a state may give categorical preference to the marital father over the biological 
father to be a matter of public policy for the state to decide. See id. at 129-30.1 
1
 Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. was joined by Justice Rehnquist, and in all but 
footnote 6, by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, 
and wrote separately to distinguish the issues at hand as he saw them: first, is it 
unconstitutional to prevent Michael from obtaining a judicial determination that he is her 
biological father; and second, is it unconstitutional to deny Michael a fair opportunity to 
prove that the child's best interests would be served by granting him visitation? See 
Michael H. v. Gerald P.. 491 U.S. 110.132 (1989). As to the first question, Justice 
Stevens wrote: "I agree with Justice Scalia that the Federal Constitution imposes no 
obligation upon a State to 'declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges upon the 
requested declaration.' The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.'" Id. 
at 133 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983)). As to the second question, 
Justice Stevens assumed for the purposes of his opinion that a constitutionally protected 
family relationship might exist between Michael H. and his daughter. As distinct from this 
case, Michael H.'s daughter identified Michael as her father, calling him "Paddy" jd. at 144, 
and the child's guardian ad litem asserted that she had more than one psychological or de 
facto father and should be entitled to maintain her filial relationship with both. jd. at 114. If 
so, Justice Stevens concluded, the relationship was sufficiently protected by California law 
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Michael H. differs from this case in that, in Michael H., the mother remained married 
to the husband and the alleged biological father was denied access to the child. In this 
case, the mother is now married to intervenor, and intervener's access to the child is 
therefore secure. It is intervener's contention that this distinction renders the reasoning of 
Michael H. inapplicable and elevates his interest to a fundamental right.2 
that gave Michael H. the opportunity to prove his entitlement to visitation as "any other 
person having an interest in the welfare of the child." ]d. at 133. Utah law also affords the 
psychological parent of a child the right to seek visitation with the child. See Gribble v. 
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). Here, intervenor does not claim to be Zachary's 
psychological parent (and it is undisputed that he is not and that petitioner is) and does not 
seek rights in Zachary on any ground other than as would ensue from a judicial declaration 
that he is Zachary's biological father. The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
federal constitution does not entitle him to such relief. 
2
 Whereas the integrity of the marriage is not at issue in this case due to the dissolution of 
the Pearson's marriage, the integrity and sanctity of the parent-child relationship developed 
in the context of the marital family is and calls into play the same considerations that 
defeated Michael H's claim. Moreover, the real effect of denying intervenor the right to be 
declared Zachary's legal father is of much less significance here, where intervener's ability 
to develop a relationship with Zachary is not impaired by the denial: intervenor is assured a 
relationship with Zachary, essentially of his own making, by virtue of his marriage to 
Zachary's mother. By contrast, the alleged biological father in Michael H. was completely 
cut off from the child with whom he sought visitation by the dismissal of his paternity suit. 
Courts in our sister states have had no difficulty barring a biological father's claims where, 
as here, it is clear that the real purpose of the suit is to cut off the ex-husband's rights in the 
child, not to secure rights of visitation that have been denied. See Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 
S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) ("Public policy will not permit a mother and an alleged father 
to enlist the aid of the courts to disturb the emotional ties existing between a child and his 
legal father after sitting on their rights for the first three years of the child's life."); In re. 
D.B.S., 888 P.2d 875,887 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding dismissal of paternity action 
brought by alleged biological father of child who married mother after mother's divorce from 
husband, stating: "[T]he child's present relationships are healthy and stable, the child is 
unconcerned with his parentage, [ ] a blood test would threaten relationships which have 
supported the child from birth and promise to support him in the future[, and t]he movant's 
motives are suspect."). 
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The reasoning of Michael H. pertains and does not turn on the mother's current 
marital status. The question remains whether the relationship between a married woman, a 
man married to another woman with whom she commits adultery, and a child alleged to be 
born of that union into the extant marriage of the woman and her husband, has been treated 
as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, jd. at 124. It is 
impossible to find that it has. Historically, adultery has been treated as a crime, and it 
remains a crime in this state. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-103. At common law, alienation 
of affection and criminal conversation were widely recognized torts, the latter being directed 
specifically to adultery. The tort of alienation of affection, by which liability may attach to a 
third person who intentionally interferes with a marital relationship, retains continued validity 
in this state. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). 
Traditionally, society was so scornful of bringing children into the world as a result of 
adulterous conduct that "bastardy" was also a crime. Utah's Bastardy Act was enacted in 
1911 as part of the penal code and provided for the arrest and arraignment of the putative 
father. Whereas the father of a child born out of wedlock historically had no parental rights 
in his child, the husband's rights in children born to his marriage have, from ancient times, 
been protected by the presumption of legitimacy. 
Consistent with the presumption of legitimacy and vindicating similar policies, Lord 
Mansfield's Rule dates back to the common law of the eighteenth century, gained wide 
acceptance in the jurisdiction of this country, and has continued application today in this 
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state. See In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). The rule forbids a husband or wife to 
give testimony that would that would tend to illegitimate their child, or for a court to consider 
such evidence. See id. at 714 (holding court of appeals erred in relying on evidence that 
contravened Lord Mansfield's rule). In 1777, Lord Mansfield said: "It is a rule founded in 
decency, morality, and policy that they [husband and wife] should not be permitted to say 
after marriage that the offspring is spurious; or especially the mother, who is the offending 
party." See Lopes v. Lopes, 518 P.2d 687,691 n.3 (Utah 1974). 
It is clear that our history and traditions demonstrate a resounding repugnance for 
the conduct of fathering a child in the marriage of another man. It cannot be claimed to be a 
"right" traditionally protected by our society and rooted in the history, tradition and the 
conscience of our people. To the contrary, the conduct has been criminalized, the resulting 
biological link accorded no protection, and the child and husband of the marriage protected 
from such claims by longstanding, universally applicable laws with enduring application to 
the present day. 
Moreover, even if it were appropriate in this case to look at the liberty interest that 
the trial court identified as "rights afforded to a natural parent" in isolation from both 
petitioner's and Zachary's liberty interests that are necessarily implicated by those rights, 
which it is not, intervener's claim of constitutional protection must fail. The extent to which 
an unwed biological father's interest in parental rights in his child will acquire constitutional 
protection depends on the extent to which the unwed father "demonstrates a full 
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i iniirmtini'iii tn i|n< it'spunsibilitips ol parenthood by '[coming] forward to participate in the 
rearing of his child.'" Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). The interest the unwed 
father has is an opportunity interest, which is lost when he fails to seize the moment and 
permits another to assume the responsibility of meeting the child's needs. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.12(e) ("An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires 
constitutional protection when limit urn mstrates a limHy and lull unninitiiipnt In the 
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth."). 
In In re D.B.S.. 888 P.2d 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995), the court addressed the 
constitutional claims of a man in intervener's position who had not promptly asserted 
parental rights in his child, but instead allowed the child's legal father to do so. After the 
mother and legal father divorced, the biological father then man I 
argued that the relationship he subsequently developed with the child should be accorded 
constitutional protection. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected this argument. The court noted that the 
biological father had not been prevented from developing a relationship with the child by the 
mother, but rather had agreed to "stay i nit df tin piduie' l<l, i lM4 Tli^ umrt held "|lln 
agreeing other's request] to stay mil nf the picture, [the biological father] 
surrendered whatever constitutional opportunity he may have had to develop a protected 
relationship with D.B.S. There is no authority to support the proposition that having 
surrendered those rights he could later reclaim them by developing a stepfather relationship 
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after four years of providing no parental contact or support. We are justified, as the United 
States Supreme Court did in Lehr, to hold that [the biological father's] interest in [the child] 
came too late to preserve any constitutional liberty interest. [The legal father] voluntarily 
assumed the duties of paternity long before [the biological father] acted to secure any rights. 
Therefore, without following the plurality opinion in Michael H., but relying on the total 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court therein, we hold the rights of [the biological 
father] herein do not amount to a liberty interest sufficient to require that he be granted the 
requested blood tests." id-
Even in Texas, where the Texas Supreme Court held its statutory scheme denying 
standing to an alleged biological father to assert paternity in a child born into the marriage of 
another unconstitutional under the Texas constitution, the court emphasized that the 
biological father must assert his interest near the time of the child's birth to preserve it. The 
court held: "In a situation such as that presented here where the biological father does 
assert his interest near the time of the child's birth, standing is constitutionally mandated if 
he both 1) acknowledges responsibility for child support or other care and maintenance, and 
2) makes serious and continuous efforts to establish a relationship with the child." In re 
J.W.T.. 872 S.W.2d 189,195 (Tex. 1994). 
In this state, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an unwed biological father's 
opportunity interest in parenting his child is inchoate only and requires a demonstrated and 
timely commitment to the responsibilities of parenting to warrant constitutional protection. 
44 
Cf. Swavne v. Lu.S. Social Services, 7M,;i P.2d 637 (Utah 1990) (discussing cases 
involving unwed father's opportunity interest). Intervener's interest, which involves a 
legitimate child born into the marriage of another man, does not gain greater protection by 
that circumstance than the unwed biological father who has refrained from violating another 
man's marriage, so that he alone among unwed biological fathers is afforded the lu 
choosing when he may decide it is convenient to come forvi • assert his interests. 
Rather, the circumstance of the child being born into the marriage of another man is 
analogous to adoption from birth: the alleged biological father takes the risk that any 
interest he may have in the child will be cut off by the legal father's acceptance of the child 
into his family. See Dawn P. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 17 Cal. llh 932 (Cal. 
1998) ("A man who wishes to father a child and ensuie hi*- lelationship with \\\?.\ child can 
oartner, entering into a marriage, and undertaking the responsibilities 
marriage imposes. One who instead fathers a child with a woman married to another man 
takes the risk that the child will be raised within that marriage and that he will be excluded 
from participation in the child's life."). 
I" us case, intervenor, with full knowledge of respondent's pregnancy, and believing 
Hie <hili I lu be his from January 1999, took no steps whatsoever to come forward and 
shoulder the burdens of fatherhood during the pregnancy, nor to establish a relationship 
with Zachary or assert an interest in him after his birth. He did nothing, choosing to sit on 
whatever rights he may have had for two years, until January 2001, when he filed a motion 
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to intervene in the Pearson's divorce action. He so conducted himself to maintain intact the 
deception of his wife. It was intervener's choice, and no one else's, to elevate his separate 
interests above his interest in Zachary. 
Though intervenor has now developed a healthy step-parent relationship with 
Zachary (and Nicholas), he cannot reclaim the lost opportunity that he may have had to 
come forward and act as Zachary's father. Zachary now has an established father, who is 
not simply a fungible item capable of replacement at the convenience of another. See In re 
Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439,446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("The relationship of 
father and child is too sacred to be thrown off like an old cloak, used and unwanted."). 
The trial court erred in concluding, without analysis, that intervenor had 
constitutionally protected rights as Zachary's biological father, and in failing to recognize 
petitioner's constitutionally protected right to retain his legal relationship with Zachary intact. 
Because of the trial court's erroneous views, it conducted the Schoolcraft analysis in an 
analytically flawed way, being overly solicitous of intervener's biological connection with 
Zachary. Cf. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635,644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (vacating 
court's order based on analytically flawed findings where trial court believed Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-5-2 was unconstitutional). 
This court should reverse the trial court and reinstate the recommendations of the 
commissioner based on the record that has now been established, holding that intervenor 
does not have standing to establish paternity of Zachary. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
granted intervenor standing to assert his paternity of Zachary, 
petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that intervenor and 
respondent were equitably estopped from denying petitioner's paternity of Zachary 
(R.1361). In compliance with Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules nl Civil Piuadure, 
petitioner's memorandum in suppoil of the motion set forth his statement of undisputed 
facts supported l>y citation to relevant materials (R.1304). 
Neither intervenor nor respondent controverted petitioner's fact statement, nor did 
either party's response, by affidavits or otherwise as provided in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for 
(R.1377,1427). Therefore, "each fact set forth by petitioner in his memorandum was 
deemed admitted loi tin1 purpose of summary judgment," Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A), and 
petitic was entitled to summary judgment if the facts he set forth supported judgment in 
his favor as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. 
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgi i ludinq that "the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of this case." (R.1741, fl 4.) This 
i rroneous. The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, 
admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not take on the basis of the first 
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party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that 
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. See Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 1999 UT 
100,1f 34; State v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997). 
The uncontroverted facts show that respondent and intervenor acted consistently 
with petitioner's paternity of Zachary for two years, from the time they learned of Zachary's 
conception until they commenced this litigation. Respondent's statements and actions, 
wherein she actively sought and encouraged petitioner's assumption of the role of Zachary's 
father, are inconsistent with her subsequent position that petitioner is not Zachary's father. 
Likewise, intervener's failure to act as a father to Zachary for two years while petitioner 
openly assumed that role, and his active concealment of Zachary's paternity for his own 
purposes, are inconsistent with his later asserted claim of paternity. The uncontroverted 
facts establish that the first element of equitable estoppel is met. 
The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the second and third elements of 
equitable estoppel are also met. Respondent's representations to petitioner that she viewed 
petitioner as Zachary's father and wished petitioner to treat him in all respects as his son, 
making no distinction between him and Nicholas, and intervener's acquiescence in that 
course of conduct, were an integral part of petitioner's bonding with Zachary as his father. 
Relying on respondent's repeated representations and assurances, petitioner took on the 
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commitment of fatherhood, caring ti • • respondent throughout her pregnancy, 
andshouidenmi pi unary caretaking responsibilities for Zachary upon his birth. 
Petitioner acted both reasonably and morally in taking on the responsibilities of 
father to Zachary, a child born into his marriage and younger brother to his first son, at his 
wife's request and in support of their continued marriage. Had he not done so, respoi .; t 
would have been without support during her pregnam y ,nnl u\ least tho first 111 
Zachary's life, and Zachary would have been without a father during his infancy and young 
childhood. Moreover, after respondent left the marital home, Zachary and Nicholas would 
have been separated from one another half-time to accommodate petitioner's custody of 
Nicholas while Zachary remained with respondent. 
It is both reasonable and socially desirable for petitioner V > have acted as h* did 
rather than to have repudiated the rnamaoY' which had functioned well for the care and 
upbringing of Nicholas and was not without hope of overcoming the differences between the 
spouses. It is both reasonable and socially desirable for petitioner to have acted as he did 
rather than to have repudiated the child, leaving him fatherless and disrupting the sibling 
relationship with his older brother. 
Additionally, it was entirely within respondent and intervenor's control to prevent 
petition; >i from Urn. \>>u the role of Zachary's father had they desired that he not do so. 
Intervenor could have asserted his paternity of Zachary and stepped forward to take on the 
responsibilities attendant thereto from the date he first learned of respondent's pregnancy. 
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Respondent could have left the marital home and reared Zachary on her own or with 
intervenor had she not desired petitioner's participation. Had they done so, petitioner could 
not and would not have developed the relationship that he did with Zachary. It was 
respondent's and intervener's actions that resulted in petitioner and Zachary developing the 
parent-child bond that they now enjoy, while intervenor's relationship is that of step-parent. 
For respondent and intervenor to be permitted to now repudiate the course that they 
chose for two years is inequitable and unjust and injures petitioner. He is denied the fruits 
of the labor he has undertaken for Zachary's benefit, with the reasonable expectation that 
he would continue in his status as Zachary's father. Moreover, he suffers the inestimable 
loss of the father-child relationship that he has developed with Zachary, being relegated 
instead to the role of "non-parent" with no legal custody rights and visitation as a "third 
party". All the elements of equitable estoppel are met in this case, and the doctrine should 
have been applied to bar respondent and intervenor from pursuing their untimely challenge 
to Zachary's paternity. 
The doctrine has been applied in our sister states to bar assertions of paternity under 
similar circumstances. See Kristen P. v. Stephen P., N.Y.S.2d 771,773 (App. Piv. 2001) 
(applying equitable estoppel to bar mother and biological father from challenging husband's 
paternity of 4-year-old child with whom husband had developed a parent-child relationship, 
concluding that "[i]t would be unjust and inequitable to permit [the biological father] to take a 
parental role at this late juncture."); Richard W. v. Roberta Y.. 658 N.Y.S.2d 506,506-07 
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(App. Div. 1997); In re Marriage of Sleeper, 92! ; : ' ! - } - ^29-30 (Oi App. 1996) 
(estopping wil' • lr< »m contesting husband's paternity of children born into their marriage, 
fvpn thnimh husband had had a vasectomy and both wife and husband knew husband was 
not the biological father of the children, yet they held him out to be, and husband had relied 
on wife's assertions that he was the children's father, though they were not his biological 
children, to develop a deep parental both with the children); Randy AJ. v. Norma I.J., 677 
d biological father of child born during mother's 
> husband were estopped from asserting genetic test results to rebut the marital 
child presumption where mother and biological father stood silent for 15 months while 
husband and child developed deep emotional ties, husband paid child's expenses, and 
husband had organized his life around providing for the child's needs); see also Dipaolo v. 
Cuqini, 811 A.2d 1053,1056-57 (Super. Ct. Pa. 2002)(affirming dismissal of mother's 
( ^hild support against biological father where husband and wife held out 
children as their own for 6 years, observing: '"[T]he doctrine of estoppel in paternity actions 
is aimed at 'achieving fairness between the parents by holding them, both mother and 
father, to their prior conduct regarding the paternity of the child.'")(citation omitted); In re 
Shocklev, 123 S.W.3d 642(Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (applying equitable estoppel against mother 
>/ears after birth of child encouraged non-biological father to assume rights and 
duties of father, observing that "[e]stoppel is based on the public policy that children should 
be secure in knowing who their parents are."). 
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Additionally, the Uniform Parentage Act (2002), approved and recommended for 
enactment in all the states by the national conference of commissioners on uniform state 
laws, incorporates the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar challenges to a child's paternity 
under appropriate circumstances where the child has a presumptive father. See Unif. 
Parentage Act § 608 (2002), 37 Fam. Law Q. 5 (Spring 2002). The Uniform Parentage Act 
has been introduced for adoption in this state this legislative session. See S.B. 14. 
There can be little doubt that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is validly applied in 
paternity actions, and that it has application in this case. The court erred in concluding that 
"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of this case." R.1741, fl 4. 
This court should reverse the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that, as a matter of law, respondent and intervenor are equitably 
estopped from challenging Zachary's paternity. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION 
AGAINST PETITIONER IN HIS CLAIM FOR CUSTODY OF ZACHARY 
The Utah Supreme Court restated and formalized the parental presumption in 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). The court stated: "This presumption 
recognizes 'the natural right and authority of the parent to the child's custody ' It is 
rooted in the common experience of mankind, which teaches that parent and child normally 
share a strong attachment or bond for each other, that a natural parent will normally 
sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the child's benefit, and that a natural parent is 
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understanding and better able to win the confidence and 
of the child than anyone else.'" Id. at 40 (citations omitted). 
The rationale for the presumption is that it will normally serve the best interests of the 
child, which is the governing consideration in custody cases. Kishpaugh v. Kishpauqh, 745 
P.2d 1248,1250 (Utah 1987). Where it does not do so, rigid application i il Hie presumpiiun 
is not mandated. Cf. InreH.R.V., 9Ub P 2d 91 '\ fM/ I'HHII V\ App 1995) (stating that 
Hutchison "does not require an inflexible, formulaic approach"). Thus, the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Kishpauqh v. Kishpaugh: "We have not hesitated to find the presumption 
inapplicable when we have concluded that it does not serve the best interests of the child in 
a particular class of cases." 745 P.2d at 1255, n.1. 
This court stated in In re H.R.V. that "children h,.ivi» a right to be loved, protected, 
. ii n I uii i 'i 11« it,. ii n I society has an interest in seeing that they are. Allowing a natural parent 
to reassert the parental presumption after the parent's own conduct has destroyed that 
presumption would do nothing to further the children's rights or society's goals. Neither 
would such a practice serve the children's long-recognized need for stability in 
relationships." 906 P.2d 917 (Uta. App. 1995). 
Likew ' who is the biological parent of a child born into her 
marriage with her husband, to assert the presumption against her husband in a divorce 
proceeding, where her own conduct affirmed, nurtured and encouraged the parent-child 
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bond between the husband and child, defeats society's goal of protecting children from 
destabilization of their parental relationships at divorce. 
Welcoming an infant into one's marriage and nurturing it through crucial periods in 
which parent-child bonds form creates exactly the relationship that the parental presumption 
seeks to protect, namely, one of mutual attachment, willingness to sacrifice for the child, 
and unique ability to win the child's confidence and love. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court 
made clear in Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 760 (Utah), cert denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985), 
a biological parent may not assert the parental presumption against an adoptive parent. 
In this case, like in Bonwich, the Hutchison presumption should not apply. While no 
Utah case is directly on point with the factual scenario presented by this case, other 
jurisdictions have addressed the parental presumption where it has been asserted against a 
presumptive father. 
In Davis v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001), LaBrec legitimated his one-year-old 
son pursuant to Georgia statute and then initiated a custody proceeding against the mother. 
In response, the mother asserted that LaBrec was not the child's biological father. 
Subsequently Davis, the child's biological father, filed a complaint to set aside the previous 
legitimation order, to establish paternity and to obtain custody of the child. Id. at 76-77. 
The trial court granted Davis's petition, concluding that if the biological father was found to 
be fit, the court was required to grant the petition, jd. at 77. On appeal the Georgia 
Supreme Court held that the trial court had applied the wrong standard, reasoning: "First, 
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LaBrec qal father.... LaBrec stands in • • ^- osition as any other 
parent and possesses the same custodial rights with respect to the c h i l d — [PJrior to any 
State involvement, LaBrec had a developed father and son relationship with the child which 
was later consummated through legitimation proceedings Under these circumstances, 
we find that Davis's interests as the biological father are adequately protected by II ie bu-ot 
interests of llii'UnidbLiiiildk "1 (citations omitted). 
In Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179 (N.H. 1996), the trial court determined that the 
husband's legal paternity was rebutted upon the establishment of the biological father's 
paternity and that he thereafter had no custodial rights in the child at issue. Id. at 1181. 
The husband appealed. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the paternity 
determination, but reversed the (,uo;..< . ermination. The court stated: ' 
instances in which an individual assert legal rights to a child not biologically his own is 
if that person stands in loco parentis toward the child By acting in loco parentis, an 
individual admits the child into his family and treats the child as a family member 
Although the assumption of in loco parentis status is voluntary, while the relationship exists 
an individual is 'charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities.'" Id. 
182 (citations omitted). Tin • rourl emphasized: "Which party or parties are ultimately 
entitled to custody of the child must be judicially ascertained among all relevant individuals 
using the best interests of the child as the primary guide. We therefore remand the case for 
a hearing to determine custody consistent with the best interests of the child." Jd. at 1184. 
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The Arkansas Court of Appeals applied the same reasoning in Moss v. Moss, CA99-
1312 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). Here, the trial court awarded custody of two children, ages 6 
and 3, to the husband based on the best interests of the children. The older child was the 
husband's biological child and the younger child was the child of another man, born during 
the marriage. Both children were the biological children of the wife. The wife appealed, 
arguing that the trial court erred in awarding custody of the younger child to the husband 
without first making a finding that she, the biological parent, was unfit. The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in applying the best interests 
standard where the evidence established that the husband stood in loco parentis to the 
younger child. |d. 
Our supreme court adopted the doctrine of in loco parentis in Gribble v. Gribble, 583 
P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). There, the court granted a husband standing to seek visitation of his 
step-son, stating: "'Where one stands in loco parentis to another, the rights and liabilities 
arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and 
child.'" Id. at 66 (citation omitted). The court noted that the husband claimed to have lived 
with his stepson since he was two months old and to have treated him as his own son. "If 
these claims are true," the court stated, "and if they indicate his desire to stand in the place 
of a parent, then appellant's relationship may entitle him to the same rights accorded to 
natural parents." jd. at 67. 
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The doctrine was subsequently reaffirmed in Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, 
where the court noted: "The term 'in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent, and a 
'person in loco parentis' is one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent 
without formal adoption. Whether or not one assumes this status depends on whether that 
person intends to assume that obligation. 'Where one stands in loco parentis to another, 
the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same 
as between parent and child.'" id. 1| 36, n.11. 
In F.B.V.A.L.G., 795 A.2d 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), the New Jersey 
court explained: "The in loco parentis principle is a venerable concept. As a private law 
rule, it developed in the common law for a variety of policy reasons expressly to govern 
family situations within a marriage in which a child was born and acknowledged by the male 
head of the family, and treated by him as other children were or would have been treated, 
with a later discovery that another person was the biological father of the child Even in 
contemporary contexts, the private law in loco parentis principle and concepts flowing 
therefrom have been applied primarily in situations in which a parent-child relationship has 
developed in a family setting. The principle has been useful in determining whether to apply 
waiver or estoppel either to a person functioning as a parent who believed initially he was 
the father of the child, or to such a person who always knew he was not the biological father 
but nevertheless assumed a parental role." Id. at 335-36. 
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In this case, it is clear that petitioner is and has functioned as a parent to Zachary 
from before his birth. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that respondent was entitled to 
the benefit of the parental presumption in her claim for custody of Zachary as against 
petitioner, finding: "[l]t is ironic at best to concude that petitioner is a non-parent of Zachary 
when in real terms petitioner has established a strong mutual bond and relationship with 
Zachary, albeit in loco parentis." (R.2434, at 20, fl 35). The court felt compelled to "followQ 
the dictates of the Hutchison case" and ruled accordingly (R.2434, at 20, U 35). 
Hutchison does not dictate that respondent is entitled to the parental presumption 
against petitioner for two reasons. First, Hutchison did not involve a child born into the 
husband's marriage. Rather, as the supreme court states in the first sentence of the case, 
the controversy in Hutchison was between former spouses over the custody of a child "born 
to the wife before their marriage." 649 P.2d 38,39 (Utah 1982). The supreme court took 
special care to note that the husband was not seeking custody of the child as one who had 
created a legal relationship with her through adoption by acknowledgment, but rather "as a 
third party with whom the child should be placed in the best interest of the child." id. at 42, 
n.1. Thus, whereas petitioner enjoyed a legally recognized father-child relationship with 
Zachary, the husband in Hutchison did not. 
Secondly, the husband in Hutchison did not assert that he stood in loco parentis to 
the child, and the supreme court did not address the issue. In this case, the trial court has 
found that petitioner stands in loco parentis to Zachary. It is therefore appropriate to apply 
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Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), which would confer upon petitioner "the same 
rights accorded to natural parents." Id. at 67. 
This case, like Bonwich. involves a parent who enjoyed the legal relationship of 
parent-child with the child as to whom he seeks custody. Additionally, he stands in loco 
parentis to the child. Therefore, this case falls into a class of cases in which the best 
interests of the child is not served by application of the presumption. The trial court's 
conclusion that respondent benefits from the presumption should be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTERVENOR CUSTODY 
RIGHTS IN NICHOLAS 
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law appear to award intervenor 
custody rights in Nicholas, stating that "Kimberlee and Peter will make school placement 
decisions for both boys if the children reside in Oregon," R.2434, at 26, fl 44, and 
"Kimberlee / Peter... would have the option of a ten-day period of uninterrupted access to 
both boys." Id. at 27,1| 47. Intervenor is not a contestant for custody of Nicholas, and the 
parental presumption enjoyed by petitioner and respondent as to Nicholas was not been 
rebutted. Therefore the court erred in awarding intervenor any custody rights in Nicholas. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT PRIMARY PHYSICAL 
CUSTODY OF NICHOLAS, AND RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR JOINT 
LEGAL CUSTODY AND PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF ZACHARY 
In its Conclusion of Law No. 2, the court stated: "Respondent is designated the 
primary physical custodian of Nicholas." R.2434, at 35, fl 2. The court's award is an abuse 
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of discretion because (1) it does not comport with the schedule actually established by the 
court, and (2) the court's findings are legally inadequate to support it. 
A. The Court's Designation of Respondent as Primary Physical Custodian 
of Nicholas is Inconsistent With Its Award of 50/50 Physical Custody to 
Petitioner and Respondent and Should be Vacated 
Petitioner and respondent shared 50/50 custody of both Nicholas and Zachary from 
the time that they separated in 1999 through the time of trial. The court-appointed custody 
evaluator recommended that the 50/50 physical custody schedule continue, and the court 
adopted the evaluator's recommendation. R.2434, at 26, U 47. Nevertheless, the court 
additionally found that "p]t is in the best interests of Nicholas that respondent be designated 
the primary physical custodian of Nicholas." Id. fl 46. 
The court's designation of respondent as "primary physical custodian of Nicholas" is 
inconsistent with its award of equal time with Nicholas to petitioner and respondent. 
"Physical custody" refers to the amount of time that the child lives in his or her parents' 
respective homes. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2). An award of equal physical 
custody means that the child spends equal time in each home, and forecloses designation 
of a primary physical residence for the child. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(d) (stating 
that joint legal custody is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical 
custody, as best interests often requires a designation of primary residence); Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428,434 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (award of 57% visitation to mother 
provides basis for trial court's identification of mother as having "primary physical custody."). 
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In this case, the court found that it was in Nicholas's best interests to spend equal 
time with petitioner and respondent and established an equal physical custody schedule 
accordingly. Hence neither petitioner nor respondent can be appropriately designated the 
primary physical custodian of Nicholas. The court's designation of respondent as primary 
physical custodian of Nicholas should be vacated. 
B. The Court's Findings are Legally Insufficient to Support its Award of 
Primary Physical Custody of Nicholas to Respondent 
Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code mandates that, "[i]n determining any form of 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, the following: (i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties; (ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, 
including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent; 
and (iii) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (2004). 
Our appellate courts have developed additional factors for the trial court's guidance 
in defining "the best interests of the child". See Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117,120 (Utah 
1986) (identifying function-related factors, including "the stability of the environment 
provided by each parent"); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38,41 (Utah 1982) (identifying 
factors relating to the child's feeings or special needs and factors relating to the prospective 
custodians' character or status or capacity or willingness to function as parents). 
In this case, to support its award of 50/50 custody of Nicholas to petitioner and 
respondent, the court adopted as its findings the Rule 4-903 factors addressed by the 
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custody evaluator. R.2434, fl 34. Based on these findings, and the evaluator's testimony 
that Nicholas and Zachary shared unusually equivalent attachments to petitioner and 
respondent, R.2534,719:7, and that Nicholas's time with petitioner should not be reduced 
below the 50 percent level, id. at 829:18 - 830:12, the court concluded: "It is in the best 
interests of Nicholas and Zachary that there be a joint physical custody arrangement" with 
the seven-day rotation as to Nicholas, and a somewhat reduced schedule as to Zachary 
beginning September 2004. R.2434,1f47. 
Petitioner does not dispute the sufficiency of the court's findings to support the 
50/50 custody award. However, petitioner does dispute the sufficiency of these findings to 
support the award of primary custody to respondent. The findings cannot support a 50/50 
physical custody award and also support an award of primary custody to respondent that 
permits respondent to remove Nicholas from the state, rendering the 50/50 shared physical 
custody arrangement impossible 
With respect to the Rule 4-903 factors addressed by the evaluator and adopted by 
the court, it is important to note that only two factors appeared to have been weighed in 
favor of respondent over petitioner, namely, the benefit of keeping siblings together and the 
ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care. With respect to the first factor, the 
court found: 
Zachary and Nicholas are very best friends and it is likely that their sister, 
Madelaine, will join their unusually strong relationship. Madelaine is Nicholas' 
half-sister and Zachary's full sister. Those three children should not be 
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separated absent some compelling circumstances not present here. There is 
a substantial benefit of keeping these siblings together. R.2434, j[ 34.b. 
The Utah Supreme Court first articulated a preference for keeping siblings together 
as a factor in custody awards in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979). The 
parties in Jorgensen had two children during their five-year marriage, a daughter and a son. 
The trial court awarded the father custody of the son and the mother custody of the 
daughter. The mother appealed, arguing that she should have been awarded custody of 
both children. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's custody 
determination, holding: "While it is true that a child custody award which keeps all the 
children of the marriage united is generally preferred to one which divides them between the 
parents, that preference is not binding in the face of considerations dictating a contrary 
course of action." jd. at 512. 
Subsequently, in Pennington v. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court further qualified the preference, explaining that it does not pertain to 
situations in which a child is born after the marriage such that the siblings had not in fact 
lived together during the marriage. The court explained: "We have also expressed a 
preference to keep siblings together. However, many of the reasons underlying such a 
preference are not present in this case. The younger child, Mark, was born months after 
entry of the divorce decree. Michael was already in respondent's custody. Except for brief 
periods of visitation, the brothers have never lived together. No bonding between them 
occurred prior to their parents' divorce." Id. at 256; see also Deeben v. Deeben. 772 P.2d 
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972 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirming trial court's award of custody of older child to father, 
infant child to mother); Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172,1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(affirming trial court's award of older child to father, infant child to mother and approving trial 
court's finding "[t]here is no particular special need created by and bond between siblings, 
there being no particular attachment of the sister to the newborn brother at this time"). 
Thus, the preference for keeping siblings together pertains to siblings of a marriage 
who have lived together and formed important sibling relationships. As the Utah Supreme 
Court explained, the purpose of the preference is to minimize the "emotional trauma [to a 
child] caused by stresses . . . to the bonds between [the child] and his siblings with whom 
he has resided for several years." Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 254,256 (Utah 
1985). Where no emotional trauma would result from separation, the preference should be 
given no weight. Further, where a child is bom after the marriage is dissolved, to another 
marriage, and therefore never united with the children of the marriage, the preference is 
inapplicable. 
In this case, respondent and intervenor gave birth to an infant daughter, Madelaine, 
eight months prior to the trial. The child is not a child of the marriage between petitioner 
and respondent, and has never been "united" with Nicholas and Zachary. Nicholas and 
Zachary have always been separated from Madelaine to a substantial degree, having only 
lived with her part-time while in respondent's care. Thus, the evaluator acknowledged that a 
long-distance schedule, similar to the one that she recommended for petitioner should the 
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court permit the children to be relocated to Oregon and petitioner chose to remain in Salt 
Lake City, would be adequate to maintain the boys' relationship with Madelaine (R.2534, at 
858:13 - 859:22). It is legally and factually inappropriate to lump Nicholas and Zachary 
together with Madelaine as "three siblings" that should not be separated. 
Additionally, with respect to Nicholas and Zachary, the two siblings at issue, the 
court's finding is inconsistent with its award, which separates the two boys for several days 
a month, though respondent has taken the position that the boys should not be separated. 
R.2536, at 1211:15-22; R.27, If 5, and petitioner agrees. To the extent that the court relied 
on this factor to conclude that primary custody of Nicholas should be awarded to 
respondent, and primary custody of Zachary should be awarded to respondent and 
intervenor, the court erred. 
The second factor that the court appears to weigh in favor of respondent is the ability 
to provide personal rather than surrogate care. As to this factor, the court found: 
Both petitioner and respondent can work from home, to a large degree. Their 
ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care is generally equal 
though the respondent is in a somewhat superior position to provide that 
personal care, given her current part-time position. R.2434, if 34.g. 
It is unclear whether the court actually weighed this factor in favor of one party or the other, 
since it finds that petitioner and respondent's abilities are "generally equal." However, that 
statement is followed by the observation that respondent is in a somewhat superior position 
to provide personal care, given her current part-time position. The trial court thus equates 
respondent's "part-time position" - which is not further defined by the court in terms of hours 
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of work required per week - with less need for surrogate care. In fact, that equivalence is 
contrary to the only direct evidence adduced at trial regarding the parties' recent use of 
surrogate care. Petitioner testified that he used no surrogate care for Nicholas and 
Zachary, but was able to care for the children personally in his home without a nanny, 
whereas respondent acknowledged the regular use of a nanny in her home for Nicholas and 
Zachary. See Ex. R-9; R.2536, at 1204:6 -1207:10; R.2536, at 1262:4; R.2533, at 493:1 -
495:18. This evidence was uncontroverted. The court abused its discretion to the extent 
that it ignored the direct evidence regarding the parties' relative use of surrogate care in 
favor of an assumption regarding the need for surrogate care based on an undefined label 
of "part-time". 
The remaining factors that the court identified and relied upon to support its physical 
custody awards, again adopting the custody evaluator's analysis almost verbatim, are set 
forth under the heading "Custody" in Findings of Fact 38,39,40,41,42 and 46. These 
findings are legally inadequate to support the court's awards. Each is dealt with in turn 
below. 
1. Finding of Fact No. 38. The court states that maintaining extended family, 
social and academic networks "are of less concern than creating relationship, geographical 
and financial stability of the children." The court does not find that petitioner is less able to 
create relationship, geographical and financial stability for the children than is respondent or 
intervenor. Had the court employed a comparative analysis, geographical stability would 
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have weighed in favor of petitioner, who proposed to maintain the children's lifelong home in 
Salt Lake City, whereas respondent proposed to relocate the children to Portland. Similarly, 
the last sentence of Finding No. 38, that "the boys are in a transportable stage" and "have 
the capacity to positively adjust to a permanent move to Oregon" weighs in favor of neither 
party because it is not a comparative statement. Had the court employed a comparative 
analysis, clearly the boys had the capacity to remain in Salt Lake City, which was already 
their permanent home and required no adjustment. To the extent adjustment was required 
of the boys by moving, the factor should have weighed against respondent. 
2. Finding of Fact No. 39. The court states that petitioner is capable of 
continuing his present employment in Oregon. The court again fails to make a comparative 
finding. Since respondent's work is portable, and her employer is headquartered in Salt 
Lake City, she is equally able to continue her present employment in Salt Lake City. There 
is no record evidence to support the finding that there are job openings for petitioner in 
Portland, and the court abused its discretion in so finding, but even so, the finding favors 
neither petitioner nor respondent since the court does not find that respondent would have 
less job opportunity in Salt Lake City than respondent would have in Portland. 
3. Finding of Fact No. 40. In this finding, the court states that it is likely that 
intervenor would experience a significant reduction in income if he were to move to Utah. 
This finding, standing alone, does not favor respondent or petitioner. The court does not 
find that such a reduction in income would adversely impact the children. To the contrary, 
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the court's Finding No. 52 makes clear that intervenor could experience a 50% reduction in 
income, and nevertheless respondent and intervenor would enjoy household income 
exceeding $100,000 per year. Intervenor could make no income, and respondent and 
intervenor would still enjoy household income the equivalent of petitioner's. Additionally, 
Finding No. 53 states that, without assistance from intervenor, respondent has adequate 
resources to support Nicholas without child support from petitioner. Given these findings, 
whether intervenor experiences a significant reduction in income or not is irrelevant to the 
Nicholas's best interests and should favor neither respondent nor petitioner. Instead, 
intervener's choice to maximize his income by remaining in Oregon is simply an individual 
choice that does not bear on the custody question, except to the extent that it demonstrates 
a lack of willingness on intervener's part to sacrifice his own interests in order to be present 
on a daily basis for the children. 
The statement that it would be far more burdensome for respondent and intervenor 
to move to Salt Lake City than for petitioner to move to Portland is in the same vein, having 
no bearing on the children's best interests. It is instead simply a conclusory statement that 
preferences respondent and intervener's desire to live in Oregon over petitioner's desire to 
live in Salt Lake City, revealing a value judgment that intervener's desire to maximize his 
income is more important than petitioner's desire to remain in the city where he was born 
and raised, and where he enjoys close contact with extensive family, as well as social, 
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community, and religious networks. Assuming no improper motive, the court should not 
weigh the parties' preference at all, except as the preference will impact the children. 
Additionally, respondent's testimony is that intervenor traveled to Salt Lake City once 
a month to stay with respondent and the children in respondent's home here, and that she 
herself lived half-time in her home here. It is difficult to understand how it would be 
burdensome for her to "move" to where she already lived, albeit half-time. 
4. Finding of Fact No. 41. This finding is conclusory and contrary to the dictates 
of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10, which mandates that the court consider "the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1 )(a)(i). 
It does not weigh in favor of any of the parties. 
5. Finding of Fact No. 42. In this finding, the court recites numerous subsidiary 
findings relating to respondent, none of which are comparative in nature or otherwise 
advance the analysis of whether petitioner or respondent is the better choice of custodial 
parent. The first two sentences restate the bias that biology is the pivotal factor in 
determining custody, equating respondent's biological relationship with "all three" children -
though only two children are the subject of evaluation - with "the strongest inherent 
responsibility" for the children. There is no evidence to support the conclusion that biology 
creates the strongest "inherent responsibility" for a child, as this case demonstrates: 
Intervener's biological tie to Zachary prompted no action on his part for two years. In any 
event, speculation regarding "inherent responsibility" has no place in a custody 
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determination, which should be focused instead on the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the prospective custodians vis-a-vis the children's best interests, 
assessed by reference to actual conduct. 
The remaining statements are not comparative and can be equally applied to 
petitioner as to respondent, i.e., petitioner has obeyed the court's orders, petitioner has 
facilitated respondent's relationship with the boys, petitioner has established a stable home 
life in Salt Lake City - of longer duration and greater breadth of associations than the home 
life established by respondent in Oregon - which fully incorporates Nicholas and Zachary, 
and petitioner has chosen to establish a life for himself in Salt Lake City with logic and 
reason. 
The statement that respondent has borne the bulk of discomfort associated with 
obeying the court's temporary custody order is not tied to the children's best interests, and 
fails to recognize that the "discomfort" results from intervener's choice to remain in Portland 
for the three years that this matter was pending prior to trial, though the children lived in Salt 
Lake City. 
The finding that respondent would have to work outside the home to increase her 
earning potential does not bear on the custody determination in any discernible way. 
Finally, the statement that the children consider Oregon to be one of their homes and 
are very comfortable in that environment is not comparative, and again, would favor 
petitioner if it were comparative since Salt Lake City was the children's primary home at the 
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time of trial, was the place where Zachary had lived all his life, and was the place Nicholas 
had lived nearly all his life. 
6. Finding of Fact No. 46. This finding is conclusory as to the best interests of 
Nicholas and Zachary. As to the statement that "it is undisputed that the parties will 
relocate and will live within 100 miles of one another," the finding favors neither petitioner 
nor respondent because it does not identify which party or parties will relocate. More 
importantly, it is improper for the court to "test parental attachments or to risk detriment to 
the 'best interest' of the minor children" on the basis of testimony that a proposed move will 
or will not occur. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th 25,45 n.7 (S. Ct.1996). "Nor 
should either parent be confronted with Solomonic choices over custody of minor children." 
Id.; see also Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719,727 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting that 
mother testified she would not move if it meant losing custody of her children, but 
nevertheless adhering to a best interests analysis based on her stated intention to move). 
Petitioner testified that he believes it is in the children's best interests to remain in 
Salt Lake City with him. At the same time, he testified that if the court were to permit the 
children to be relocated to Portland, then he would follow. Like most primary parents, he 
would make whatever sacrifices are necessary to maintain his involvement in his children's 
lives. It was improper for the court to rely on this testimony to essentially force petitioner to 
move or lose 50/50 custody, after having found that the children's best interests required 
joint physical custody. Such an approach short circuits the best interests analysis 
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altogether, risks detriment to the child, and awards custody on the basis of the convenience 
of adults - or, worse, awards custody on the basis of unwillingness to move to 
accommodate the children's needs - factors only negatively related to the children's best 
interests. 
The findings as a whole, and the evaluation upon which they are based, rely on 
improper biases that have no legal foundation in the statutory or case law that governs 
custody disputes. For instance, Dr. Jill Sanders testified that she would not have 
distinguished between Nicholas and Zachary in her recommendations as to name change, 
or legal and physical custody, had it not been for the biological factor. R.2534,872:5-17. 
Yet nowhere does she connect her view of the importance of biology to the best interests of 
Nicholas and Zachary, other than by general, conclusory and speculative statements. 
Without evidence that the biological relationship between a particular child and a particular 
adult in a particular case impacts on the child's best interests in an identifiable way, it should 
not be a factor in the best interests determination. The biological relationship between 
parent and child is legally protected by the parental presumption, and should not be further 
elevated in the best interests analysis. 
It was also Dr. Jill Sanders' view, which informed in part her recommendation that 
petitioner should move to Oregon - a recommendation adopted in whole by the trial court -
that the LDS culture was a negative factor for Zachary (R.2535, at 881:15- 882:11). This 
was because, in Dr. Sanders' view, the LDS culture is particularly conservative and would 
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stigmatize Zachary because of the circumstances of his conception and birth. Id- It is 
improper and inappropriate for such biases on the part of an evaluator to play any role in the 
determination of custody. It cannot be said that Dr. Sanders' biased view of the LDS culture 
did not play such a role in this case, given the inadequacy of the findings to support her 
conclusory recommendation that petitioner move to Oregon. 
The trial court's award of primary custody of Nicholas to respondent, which adopts 
Dr. Sanders' recommendations, should be reversed. 
C. The Findings of Fact are Legally Insufficient to Support the Court's 
Award of Joint Legal and Primary Physical Custody of Zachary to 
Intervenor and Respondent 
The court concluded that respondent was entitled to the benefit of the parental 
presumption vis-a-vis petitioner in their competing claims for custody of Zachary. Petitioner 
disputes the correctness of this legal conclusion for the myriad reasons set forth earlier in 
this brief. The court made no findings of fact that support a determination that, absent the 
parental presumption, custody of Zachary should be awarded to intervenor and respondent 
based on Zachary's best interests. Instead, the court's custody award of Zachary flows 
from its application of the parental presumption against petitioner, and its conclusion that 
petitioner is a "non-parent" of Zachary, the evidence being clear that Nicholas and Zachary 
should not otherwise have been separated. If this court determines that the trial court erred 
in its application of the parental presumption against petitioner, the court should direct that 
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the 50/50 custody applicable for Nicholas be reinstated for Zachary forthwith during the 
pendency of any further proceedings. 
D. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Making Findings Regarding 
Key Factors Relative to the Children's Best Interests in this Case 
The court failed to make findings on several factors mandated by the legislature 
and/or of significance in this case, including: (1) the relative ability of the parties to provide 
continuity of environment and stability for the children; (2) the identity of the party who acted 
as the primary caretaker for the children during the marriage; (3) the relative strength of the 
children's bonds with each of the parties; (4) the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties; and (5) the identity of the party who has most consistently 
elevated the children's best interests above his or her own interests. The record is replete 
with evidence pertaining to these factors. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
make appropriate findings based on this evidence, and awarding custody instead on the 
basis of biology and other improper factors. The trial court's custody award should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should (1) reverse the trial court's order 
granting intervenor standing to establish paternity of Zachary, (2) reverse the trial court's 
denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment barring respondent and intervenor from 
challenging Zachary's paternity; (3) and reverse the trial court's custody awards based on 
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the improper presence of intervenor in this case, the improper application of the parental 
presumption against petitioner, and the trial court's inadequate findings of fact. 
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Tab A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KELLY F. PEARSON, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : CASE NO. 004907881 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, : 
Respondent. : 
PETER D. THANOS, 
Intervenor. 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on April 1, 
2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2004. Petitioner was present and represented by 
Paige Bigelow, respondent was present and represented by Steven H. 
Gunn, and intervenor was present and represented by Kellie 
Williams. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses, 
having considered the evidence presented and the argument of 
counsel, and being otherwise fully informed enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
To the extent any of the following Findings of Fact should be 
considered as Conclusions of Law, they shall be considered a 
Conclusion of Law. 
VA^ 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Fact and Procedural History 
1. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, were married 
on August 17, 1992 and were divorced on June 5, 2002 by a Decree 
which terminated their marriage, but reserved custody and 
visitation issues for later disposition. Petitioner and 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, conceived a child that was born on 
July 6, 1997, named Nicholas Browning Pearson. 
2. Also during their marriage, respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, 
conceived a child, Zachary Andrew Pearson ("Zachary") , who was born 
on September 14, 1999. However, approximately four months after 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, became pregnant with Zachary, 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, informed petitioner that intervenor, 
Pete Thanos, was Zachary's natural father. Approximately two weeks 
after Zachary's birth, respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, and 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, again informed petitioner that intervenor, 
Pete Thanos, was Zachary's father. 
3. Intervenor, Pete Thanos, obtained DNA paternity test 
results which he later filed with the District Court. The 
paternity index for intervenor is 98011 and the probability of 
paternity is 99.999%. 
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4. Respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, filed various affidavits 
with the Court, commencing January 2001, stating under oath that 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, was the natural father of the minor child. 
5. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, separated 
when Zachary was nine months of age. In his first filed Affidavit, 
petitioner acknowledged that respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, had 
become pregnant with Zachary and disclosed to petitioner that 
Zachary was intervenor, Pete Thanos' son and not petitioner's 
biological child. Other like statements are contained in various 
pleadings. In his Affidavit dated September 28, 2001, petitioner 
admitted that he was aware that intervenor, Pete Thanos, was the 
child's biological father, although he alleged that he was the 
child's "psychological" parent. In paragraph 15 of that affidavit, 
petitioner acknowledged that he does not advocate secrecy regarding 
the biological facts of Zachary's conception (implicitly 
acknowledging that Pete is the biological father). In paragraph 
16, page 11 of that document, petitioner states that, "I have at 
all times known that he [Zachary] was conceived of Mr. Thanos." 
6. At the time of Zachary's conception and birth, 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, was married to another woman. Intervenor, 
Pete Thanos' prior wife died from cancer in December, 2000. 
Intervenor, Pete Thanos, has set forth in his affidavits and in 
argument that he did not inform his prior wife of Zachary's birth 
PEARSON V. PEARSON PAGE 4 FINDINGS Sc CONCLUSIONS 
because he did not want to further damage her already fragile 
health or cause her further emotional trauma, and that he wished to 
remain with her to assist her through her final months of life. 
Based on intervener's affidavits, it appears that out of compassion 
for his then-wife, intervenor did not file a paternity action 
regarding Zachary until after her death. 
7. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, separated 
and later divorced. As part of their divorce action, they 
stipulated to a temporary order which granted them joint legal 
physical custody of Zachary and his brother Nicholas. Intervenor, 
Pete Thanos, and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, continued their 
relationship, and married on July 1, 2 002, after the Pearson 
divorce was finalized. 
8. The respondent and intervenor have since had a child as 
issue of their marriage, namely Madelaine, whose date of birth is 
July 13, 2003. Respondent and intervenor purchased a home in 
Oregon in July of 2001. Intervenor has at all times since the 
filing of his Motion for Intervention and Petition for Paternity 
been a resident of the State of Oregon. 
9. Beginning in February, 2001, intervenor, Pete Thanos, had 
ongoing contact with Zachary, which included day long visits and 
periods of vacation, although he was precluded from having 
overnight visits until he married respondent, Kimberlee Thanos. 
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The contact has been frequent and consistent since February 2001. 
As the petitioner and respondent share joint custody, the 
respondent has been traveling to Utah from Oregon for her parent 
time with Nicholas and Zachary, and has maintained a home in Utah 
for that purpose and also the children, Nicholas and Zachary, are 
transported to Oregon during the respondent's parent time. 
Madelaine typically accompanies respondent on her trips to Utah, 
petitioner has not remarried and resides in Salt Lake City. 
10. The current access schedule is one week/one week rotation 
with transitions occurring on Friday mornings. The respondent 
flies from Portland, Oregon with Madelaine and then returns to her 
home with intervenor in Oregon and, again, with Zachary and 
Nicholas as frequently as possible. 
11. As to the procedural history of this case, at the time of 
hearing before Commissioner Evans on the Motion to Intervene on 
August 30, 2001, the Commissioner analyzed the case of State of 
Utah in the Interest of J.W.F, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), known as 
the Schoolcraft case, and recommended that intervenor, Pete Thanos1 
Motion to Intervene be denied. The Commissioner reasoned that 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, lacked standing to challenge the 
presumption of paternity that existed in favor of petitioner, given 
the consideration that should be given to preserving the stability 
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of marriage and to ensure that the children are protected from 
disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity. 
12. After briefing and argument of the case on December 3, 
2001, an Order on Objection to Recommendation was entered by this 
Court. At the time of the initial hearing, this Court found that 
the criteria outlined in the case of In re: J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990) ("the Schoolcraft case") apply to this case and set 
forth the framework to determine whether intervenor, Pete Thanos1 
Motion to Intervene should be granted. 
13. The Court found that in order to determine whether 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, had standing to intervene to establish 
Zachary's paternity and to rebut the presumption that Zachary was 
the legitimate son of petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, 
the Court must first consider the policies set forth in 
Schoolcraft. The two-prong analysis of Schoolcraft included (1) 
preserving the stability of the marriage and (2) protecting 
children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their 
paternity. The Court found that the second of the policy 
considerations—protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary 
attacks—was most applicable in this particular case, but that the 
record was insufficient to adequately address that policy 
consideration as it applied to the circumstances in this case. 
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14. The Court found that the affidavit of Dr. Goldsmith was 
not case-specific and was of little help to the Court in this 
regard. Therefore, in order for the Court to adequately address 
the second Schoolcraft policy consideration, the Court appointed 
Dr. Jill Sanders to provide an independent "Schoolcraft" 
evaluation. Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, had 
previously stipulated to Dr. Sanders conducting the custody 
evaluation in this matter. The Court then reserved judgment on 
intervenor, Pete Thanos1 standing in order to allow Dr. Sanders to 
conduct a separate preliminary evaluation. 
15. As proffered at the time of hearing before the 
Commissioner and stated in pleadings and as set forth in the 
affidavits of respondent and intervenor Zachary's physical 
resemblance to intervenor was such that Zachary would soon 
recognize that intervenor was his father. Further, the biological 
relationship between Zachary and intervenor, Pete Thanos, cannot 
and should not be hidden from the child, as intervenor, Pete 
Thanos, will continue to be an integral part of Zachary's life. 
Respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, and intervenor, Pete Thanos, have an 
intact family unit to provide care and security to Zachary. 
Further, petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, have, in one 
form or another, informed dozens of individuals in their circle of 
family, friends and acquaintances that intervenor, Pete Thanos, is 
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Zachary1s biological father. It is impossible to keep the "secret" 
of Zachary's parentage hidden from him. 
16. Dr. Sanders submitted an evaluation report to the Court 
and counsel dated May 13, 2002. Dr. Sanders1 summary opinion was 
that from a developmental and psychological prospective, Zachary's 
functioning was not inherently disrupted by intervenor, Pete 
Thanos' involvement. Further, Dr. Sanders found that intervenor, 
Pete Thanos' relationship with Zachary was not only not disruptive, 
but was necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development. 
17. In addition, Dr. Sanders noted that respondent, Kimberlee 
Thanos, and intervenor, Pete Thanos, planned to marry and that if 
they did marry, intervenor, Pete Thanos, would, at the least, have 
a role as stepfather, and that his status as Zachary's biological 
father inherently escalates the importance of the relationship 
between Zachary and intervenor. As Dr. Sanders reported, the 
relationship between parents and their biological children is 
psychologically extremely important. Dr. Sanders reported that the 
most satisfying type of relationship between a child and his 
biological parent is generally a personal one, that the 
relationship between intervenor and Zachary is essential to Zachary 
and that no one can play this role in Zachary's life except 
intervenor, Pete Thanos. Dr. Sanders also stated that, based upon 
the quality of the relationship between Zachary and intervenor and 
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the likelihood that intervenor, Pete Thanos, and Zachary would have 
continuing extensive contact, their attachment would be likely to 
deepen and become more significant over time. Dr. Sanders opined 
that if petitioner was not interested in continuing to parent 
Zachary, he would likely develop a full father/son attachment to 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, because Zachary was still young and 
because intervenor and Zachary have had contact since Zachary's 
infancy. 
18. Upon receipt of the report, petitioner did not object to 
the report, nor did he object to the Court receiving the report. 
Instead, petitioner requested further clarification with regard to 
the Schoolcraft evaluation by Dr. Sanders. Pursuant to a telephone 
conference requested by petitioner on May 28, 2002, the Court 
permitted petitioner to supplement his concerns and address the 
Court with a letter outlining his concerns and his further requests 
regarding Dr. Sanders' further analysis. Based upon petitioner's 
motion and letter, the Court directed Dr. Sanders to make further 
analysis, to-wit: the impact on the child of a disruption in 
Zachary's relationship with petitioner, and Zachary's ability to 
understand his biological relationship. 
19. In response, Dr. Sanders submitted a supplemental report 
dated August 26, 2002. Dr. Sanders found that the primary 
disruption in Zachary's relationship with petitioner occurred at 
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the parties1 separation when Zachary was approximately nine months 
of age. Dr. Sanders concluded that by age 18 months Zachary was 
firmly established in a loving, secure, and relatively predictable 
relationship with petitioner, respondent and intervenor. Dr. 
Sanders indicated that there was no inherent reason why 
intervenor's presence as another loving caregiver should have any 
further disruptive impact. 
20. In addition, Dr. Sanders stated that she did not believe 
that Zachary had lost his relationship with petitioner or that 
there was a basis to believe that further disruption to the 
relationship between Zachary and petitioner was intrinsically 
linked to intervenor, Pete Thanos' presence in Zachary!s life. Dr. 
Sanders found that given Zachary's cognitive ability at the age of 
3, Zachary can understand simple descriptions of biological facts 
of his parentage in the same way that a three-year-old adopted 
child can understand the biological facts of his or her parentage. 
She indicated that the emotional meaning of these relationships is 
unlikely to have much impact on Zachary for quite some time. 
Again, Dr. Sanders noted that Zachary has a loving relationship 
with petitioner and with intervenor. 
21. After considering both of Dr. Sanders' reports, the 
criteria applicable to the facts in this case, and the Schoolcraft 
criteria, the Court previously found that it was appropriate to 
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sustain intervenorfs objection to the recommendation of 
Commissioner Evans and grant the Motion to Intervene. The Court 
found that Dr. Sanders had very carefully articulated, to the 
Court's satisfaction, the policy considerations that the Court must 
make and find under Schoolcraft. As previously found, the first 
prong of the Schoolcraft analysis—relating to preserving the 
stability of the marriage—was not a consideration in this case, due 
to the fact that there was no marriage between petitioner and 
respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, to be preserved, and that the 
stability was shattered when the parties separated when Zachary was 
approximately nine months of age. The Court also noted that 
intervenor, Pete Thanos, and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, are now 
married. Further, pursuant to the report of Dr. Sanders intervenor 
has established a relationship with Zachary, and there was nothing 
that would be adverse to the best interests of the child or 
disruptive to him and the Court previously found it was in the best 
interest of Zachary to allow Pete Thanos to intervene. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Re: Motion for 
Intervention and Order Granting Intervention of Intervenor, Pete 
Thanos, were signed by the Court November 7, 2002. 
22. On October 10, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to 
Bifurcate, to Stay Proceedings, and to Set Date for Response to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. That matter came on for hearing 
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before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on November 1, 2002, and an 
Order on Motion to Bifurcate and to Stay Proceedings was signed 
December 16, 2002. 
23. On November 12, 2002, the petitioner filed an Answer to 
the Intervenor's Verified Petition for Paternity., 
24. The petitioner filed another Motion for Stay and For 
Expedited Disposition on or about November 20, 2002. That was 
heard by the Court on November 27, 2002, and denied by the Court 
and the Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Stay Order was signed 
December 20, 2002. 
25. On November 15, 2002, Pete Thanos, as intervenor in the 
divorce action, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with a 
supporting memorandum and Affidavit, seeking a declaration by the 
Court that intervenor, Pete Thanos, is Zachary's biological father. 
26. The petitioner filed a Motion for Stay with the Utah 
Court of Appeals on or about November 27, 2 002, requesting that the 
Court of Appeals stay the paternity and custody proceedings in the 
District Court pending resolution of the petitioner's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. Petitioner filed his Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief with the Utah Supreme Court on or about 
November 14, 2002, and the matter was transferred to the Utah Court 
of Appeals by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, given the 
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misfiling. The petitioner's Motion for Stay was summarily denied 
by the Utah Court of Appeals by an Order dated December 4, 2002. 
27. The petitioner also filed an Objection to Admissibility 
of Genetic Test Results and Motion to Strike, dated November 27, 
2002. Intervenor filed his Response to Objection to Admissibility 
of Genetic Tests on December 9, 2 002, and amended the same due to 
an error in the title of said pleading on December 23, 2002. 
28. On or about December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition to 
Intervener's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and In Support of 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Petitioner requested in 
his Motion for Summary Judgment that he be declared the legal 
*£&ther of Zachary on the basis of his controlling presumption of 
paternity or, alternatively, on the basis of the equitable parent 
doctrine or, alternatively, barring intervenor and respondent from 
challenging Zachary's parentage on the basis of equitable estoppel. 
29. Subsequent to receiving the respondent and intervener's 
response to the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Petitioner filed a reply memorandum and affidavits of Douglas 
Goldsmith and Kelly Pearson. Intervenor filed motions to strike 
the affidavits and petitioner filed a responsive memorandum thereto 
to which intervenor replied. The petitioner's Objection to 
Admissibility of Genetic Test Results and Motion to Strike and the 
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intervenor's motions to strike were heard simultaneous with 
intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
30. After hearing on intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court 
found that Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-105 (b), establishes 
concurrent jurisdiction between the District Court and the Juvenile 
Court in an action to establish paternity. This case is, in part, 
a paternity action. The Court found, however, that this is not a 
termination of parental rights action which precludes the District 
Court from exercising jurisdiction. 
31. Subsequent to the Court's consideration of all arguments 
made by petitioner, respondent and intervenor, an Order on Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Order Denying Petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was entered by the Court on May 8, 2003. 
Intervenor was declared to be the biological and natural father of 
Zachary Andrew Pearson on May 8, 2003, and the petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, dated December 9, 2002, was denied. 
32. The petitioner filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Orders on or about May 28, 2003, with the Utah Court 
of Appeals. On July 3, 2003, the Petition for Permission to Appeal 
was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
2w 
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Custody Evaluation 
33. Dr. Jill Sanders completed her child custody evaluation 
and a settlement conference was held before Commissioner Michael S. 
Evans, the parties and Dr. Sanders on August 13, 2003. That did 
not result in a settlement of this matter and a final report was 
issued by Dr. Sanders dated November 3, 2003. 
34. Dr. Jill Sanders is a licensed psychologist who this 
Court finds is a qualified expert in the performance of custody 
evaluations and is well respected and recognized in the community 
for that expertise. Dr. Sanders, prior to issuing her final report 
of November 3, 2003, conducted multiple interviews, a battery of 
psychological testing and reviewed documents presented to her by 
the parties and their counsel, and contacted collaterals as she 
deemed appropriate. The Court finds that Dr. Sanders' child 
custody evaluation was thoroughly performed and that the report 
issued complied with and addressed the requirements of Rule 4-903 
of the Code of Judicial Administration. Pursuant to that Rule and 
the requirements that the evaluator consider and, therefore, which 
the Court should consider, the Court finds the following: 
a. Nicholas and Zachary are too young to consider the 
child's preference. 
b. Zachary and Nicholas are very best friends and it is 
likely that their sister, Madelaine, will join their unusually 
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strong relationship. Madelaine is Nicholas' half-sister and 
Zachary's full-sister. Those three children should not be 
separated absent some compelling circumstances not present here. 
There is a substantial benefit of keeping these siblings together. 
c. Nicholas and Zachary have excellent relationships 
with petitioner, respondent and intervenor. 
d. The petitioner and respondent have established a 
50/50 parent time arrangement with Nicholas and Zachary, which has 
worked relatively well. 
e. Petitioner, respondent and intervenor all are of 
high moral character and exhibit strong emotional stability. 
f. Petitioner, respondent and intervenor each have 
exhibited a deep desire for custody of the children. Contrary to 
the allegations and representations of the petitioner, intervenor 
has stepped in to assume the role of parent to Zachary and did so 
although delayed, given the circumstances present in this case. 
g. The intervenor is employed full-time out of the 
home. Respondent is employed in a part-time position and 
petitioner is employed full-time. Both petitioner and respondent 
can work from home, to a large degree. Their ability to provide 
personal rather than surrogate care is generally equal though the 
respondent is in a somewhat superior position to provide that 
personal care, given her current part-time position. 
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h. None of the parties exhibit significant impairment 
of ability to function as a parent due to drug abuse, excessive 
drinking or other related causes. 
i. The petitioner is a practicing member of the LDS 
Church. Respondent is no longer a practicing member of the LDS 
Church. The respondent and intervenor support Nicholas and 
Zacharyfs participation in religious training and activities. 
Religious compatibility is not of substantial importance in this 
case. 
j. The petitioner and respondent are Nicholas' 
biological parents. The respondent and intervenor are Zachary's 
biological parents; however, Nicholas and Zachary have a strong 
attachment to both intervenor and petitioner. 
k. All three parties have the capacity financially to 
support these children. 
1. There is no evidence of abuse of either of the 
children or of any domestic violence involving the children. 
Parental Presumption 
35. The Parental Presumption recognizes the natural right and 
authority of a parent to the child's custody where one party to the 
controversy is a non-parent. The Parental Presumption is a 
rebuttable presumption and can be rebutted by evidence establishing 
that a particular parent at a particular time generally lacked all 
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three of the characteristics that give rise to the presumption: (1) 
that no strong mutual bond exists; (2) that the parent has not 
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and 
welfare for the child; and (3) that the parent lacks the sympathy 
for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of 
parents generally. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 
1982) . 
There is no Parental Presumption as to Nicholas because 
petitioner and respondent are both the natural parents of Nicholas. 
Therefore, a best interests analysis as to Nicholas is controlling. 
The Parental Presumption has application to petitioner's 
respondent's and intervener's claims for custody of Zachary. As to 
Zachary, between petitioner and respondent and intervenor, it has 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner is not 
the biological parent of Zachary. Consequently, the presumption of 
legitimacy regarding Zachary, who was born during the marriage of 
petitioner and respondent, has been rebutted. Based upon the 
evidence as set forth in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, petitioner cannot and has not established that respondent at 
any time had no strong mutual bond with Zachary, that respondent at 
any time has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice her own 
interests and welfare for Zachary, or that at any time respondent 
lacked the sympathy for and understanding of Zachary that is 
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characteristic of parents generally. In fact, the Court finds the 
opposite to be true, that respondent and Zachary have a strong 
mutual bond, that she has sacrificed her interests and welfare for 
Zachary, and has an abundance of sympathy and understanding of 
Zachary that is characteristic of parents generally. Respondent 
benefits from the Parental Presumption on her claim for custody of 
Zachary against petitioner. Consequently, respondent and 
petitioner are not on equal footing. The Parental Presumption has 
been rebutted regarding intervener's claim for custody of Zachary. 
During approximately the first 15 months of Zachary's life, 
intervenor, with the assistance of petitioner and respondent, kept 
intervener's parentage of Zachary a secret resulting in minimal 
contact between Zachary and intervenor during this period. During 
this critical 15 month period of time, intervenor and Zachary 
generally did not have a strong mutual bond, during this time 
intervenor generally did not demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice 
his own interests and welfare for Zachary, and generally lacked the 
sympathy for and understanding of Zachary that is characteristic of 
parents generally. Therefore, petitioner and intervenor stand on 
equal footing and Zachary's custody between them is determined 
solely by the best interests of the child. In the context of the 
Parental Presumption Analysis, it is ironic at best to conclude 
that petitioner is a non-parent of Zachary when in real terms 
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petitioner has established a strong mutual parental bond and 
relationship with Zachary, albeit in loco parentis. The Utah 
Supreme Court deemed Mr. Hutchison to be a "non-parent" in its 
analysis and Mr. Hutchison's parental relationship was of longer 
duration than petitioner's in the present case. 649 P.2d at 39. 
Consequently, following the dictates of the Hutchison case and in 
furtherance of the policies which support the Parental Presumption, 
this Court ruled accordingly. 
Petitioner's Experts 
36. Dr. Douglas Goldsmith's testimony is of little assistance 
or weight in the Court's determination of custody. Dr. Goldsmith 
has not met with the respondent, intervenor or children nor has he 
conducted a custody evaluation. His testimony is generic and not 
case specific and the Court finds that Dr. Goldsmith misapprehends 
Dr. Sanders' opinions regarding the importance of biological 
relationships to children. In particular, Dr. Goldsmith has no 
factual basis with which to offer an opinion regarding whether Dr. 
Sanders' recommendations regarding custody of Zachary Pearson are 
potentially damaging to Zachary. 
37. The testimony of Dr. Heather Walker is of no benefit to 
the Court. The petitioner offers her as an expert in an effort to 
discredit or call into question the quality and methodology of the 
evaluation of Dr. Sanders. The Court is not persuaded by Dr. 
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Walker's testimony that Dr. Sanders' recommendations, opinions or 
conclusions are not consistent with the data or not within the 
scope of her expertise. This Court is not persuaded that Dr. 
Sanders' statements and opinions are not supported by current 
psychological literature, though the Court believes that is of 
little weight in this Court's determination of custody. The Court 
is not persuaded by Dr. Walker that Dr. Sanders' methods are not 
consistent with the guidelines for conducting custody evaluations. 
Dr. Sanders has performed her evaluation consistent with the 
guidelines and Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
The Court finds that Dr. Sanders has assigned appropriate weight to 
the best interests of the children in her evaluation and 
recommendations and has conducted a child-centered evaluation 
according to the guidelines and consistent with the data and 
literature. Nothing in the testimony of Dr. Walker leads this 
Court to believe that a different result, conclusion or 
recommendation would be made in the event that another evaluator 
evaluated this matter. Indeed, Dr. Sanders has a long history with 
this case, having been involved with the parties and children for 
a period of time between April, 2002 and November 3, 2003. 
Custody 
38. The Court finds that there are some benefits to the 
children remaining in Salt Lake City, due to the social, family and 
9lHSi 
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academic networks. However, given the ages of the children and the 
other considerations, as set forth in these findings, maintaining 
extended family, social and academic networks are of less concern 
than creating relationship, geographical and financial stability of 
the children at this point in their development. Both boys are in 
a transportable stage and the Court finds that they have the 
capacity positively to adjust to a permanent move to Oregon. 
39. The Court cannot order any party to this action to 
relocate. Although the respondent's current employer is 
headquartered in Salt Lake City, she works from home and so her 
employment is portable. She works from her home in Oregon. 
Petitioner also works from his home. He is capable of continuing 
his present employment, if he were to move to Oregon. In addition, 
there are job openings in Portland for individuals who have skills-
like those possessed by petitioner. 
40. The intervenor is the primary financial provider for the 
Thanos family. Unlike petitioner and respondent he could not 
continue to work for his present employer if he were to move to 
Salt Lake City. It is likely that if he were to move to Utah he 
would experience a significant reduction in income. It would be 
far more burdensome for respondent and intervenor to move to Salt 
Lake City, than for petitioner to move to Portland. 
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41. In making a custody determination in this matter it is 
appropriate to rely on present realities and focus on what is in 
the best interest of the children today. It is not helpful to rely 
on historical issues or to assign fault for the breakup of the 
Pearson marriage. 
42. The respondent is pivotal in this case in that she is the 
biological mother of both boys and their sister, Madelaine. The 
respondent has the strongest inherent responsibility for all three 
of these children. At considerable inconvenience to herself and 
her husband respondent has obeyed the Court orders currently in 
place and borne the bulk of the physical, emotional and financial 
discomfort associated with it. She has performed in an exemplary 
manner in facilitating the petitioner's relationship with both 
boys. At the same time, she has established a stable home life in 
Oregon with intervenor and with their child Madelaine, which fully 
incorporates both Nicholas and Zachary. Further, intervenor has 
fully accepted and supported both boys and their relationship with 
petitioner. The respondent has chosen to establish a life for 
herself and her family in Oregon and she has done so with logic and 
reason. In order for her to increase her earning potential she 
would have to work outside the home and to hire daycare providers 
to take care of her three small children. It is not in the best 
interest of any of the children to require her to do so, the more 
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so since her present income is comparable to that of petitioner. 
The children consider Oregon to be one of their homes and are very 
comfortable in that environment. 
43. There is a sufficient level of trust between petitioner 
and the Thanoses in that all three are excellent parents which is 
a view generally shared by each party. Communications between them 
at times are tense. However, in the past and currently they have 
consistently reached a consensus concerning decisions relating to 
the upbringing of the boys. A joint legal custody relationship 
therefore does appear to be feasible and in the best interest of 
Nicholas and Zachary as further defined below. 
44. It is in the best interests of Nicholas that joint legal 
custody of Nicolas be awarded to petitioner and respondent, and 
that joint legal custody of Zachary be awarded to respondent and 
intervenor. Joint legal custody shall be further defined as set 
forth at page 12, paragraph numbered 1, of the Child Custody 
Evaluation, as follows: 
1. Legal Custody. Kimberlee and Peter should be named 
joint legal custodians of Zachary. Kimberlee and Kelly 
should be named joint legal custodians of Nicholas. 
Kelly's special relationship with Zachary should be 
legally protected in the form of third party access with 
the responsibility to make daily decisions on Zachary's 
behalf when Zachary is in his care. Kimberlee and Peter 
will make school placement decisions for both boys if the 
children reside in Oregon. Both biological parents of 
each child must agree upon any elective medical or dental 
treatment. It would be best if decisions regarding any 
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extracurricular activities would be jointly made by all 
three parents so that the boys1 schedules are manageable. 
If this is not possible, Kelly and Kimberlee will jointly 
decide on Nicholas1 activities and Kimberlee and Peter 
will jointly decide on Zachary's activities. 
45. The following factors support the conclusion that joint 
legal custody of the boys divided between petitioner and respondent 
for Nicholas and between respondent and intervenor for Zachary is 
in the boys' best interest! 
a. The emotional needs of the children will be met by 
joint legal custody. A generally positive decision making process 
has always existed between the parties and they have managed quite 
well at keeping the children out of the fray. 
b. The parenting skills and abilities of all three 
parents are excellent and complimentary. 
c. All three parties have similar major values and they 
recognize the importance of each other in the children's lives. 
d. The primary physical custody of Nicholas is awarded 
to respondent. The primary physical custody of Zachary is awarded 
to respondent and intervenor. All of the evidence, including 
petitioner's testimony indicates that petitioner will move to 
Oregon. Therefore, all three parties will live in close proximity 
to one another, which makes joint legal custody workable. 
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e. This legal custody determination is consistent with 
the custody evaluation, said custody evaluation is incorporated 
herein in full by this reference. 
46. It is in the best interests of Nicholas that respondent 
be designated the primary physical custodian of Nicholas and that 
she not be required to obtain petitioner's permission to move to 
Oregon. It is in the best interest of Zachary that respondent and 
intervenor be designated the primary physical custodians of Zachary 
and that they not be required to obtain petitioner's permission to 
move to Oregon. It should be noted that while the Court cannot 
order any party to move to another state, the evidence is 
undisputed that the parties will relocate and will live within 100 
miles of one another because it is in the best interests and needs 
of Nicholas and Zachary to live in close proximity to petitioner, 
respondent and intervenor. 
47. It is in the best interests of Nicholas and Zachary that 
there be a joint physical custody arrangement. The joint physical 
custody arrangement or access schedule for Nicholas and Zachary 
shall be as described and set forth in the Access Schedule 
recommendation of Dr. Jill D. Sanders at pages 12-13, paragraphs 
numbered 2, 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d, of the Child Custody Evaluation, as 
follows: 
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2. Access schedule. Regardless of whether this 
"extended family" lives in Salt Lake City or in Oregon 
the following schedule is recommended. However, my 
strong recommendation is that Kelly relocate to Oregon so 
that Nicholas can begin the second school term in Oregon: 
a. Continuation of the present seven day/seven day 
rotation. The children have been on this schedule since 
September and appear to be able to tolerate the amount of 
time away from the other parent. 
b. During the summer months Kimberlee/Peter and 
Kelly would have the option of a ten-day period of 
uninterrupted access to both boys. Kelly will have the 
first choice of that period in even years and 
Kimberlee/Peter will have the first choice in odd years. 
These periods may not be combined with regular access to 
form a block longer than ten days. 
c. Beginning in the school year of 2004/2005 
Nicholas will continue on the weekly rotation. 
Transitions would occur Sunday evening. Zachary will 
spend five nights with Kelly and either return to 
Kimberlee/Peter for the last two nights of the seven-day 
period or remain with them for the first two nights of 
Kelly's period (rotating each time). Nicholas would join 
Zachary at Kimberlee/Peter' s on Sunday for his continuous 
seven-day period in that home. This arrangement keeps 
the boys on a highly predictable schedule, allows them to 
spend the vast majority of their time together, allows 
each of them some time alone with their biological 
fathers, and coincides with Peter's greater availability 
on the weekends. 
d. Holidays may be rotated according to Utah 
guidelines, or according to mutual agreement, with only 
major holidays being included (i.e. UEA, Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, Spring Break, July 4th) . 
48. For purposes of transportation, each party should be 
responsible for picking up the children at the beginning of that 
parent's access 
49. It is reasonable and in the best interest of Zachary that 
his surname be changed to "Thanos." It is reasonable that an 
QLM?\ 
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explanation regarding the circumstances of each child's conception, 
birth and circumstances be crafted with the help of Dr. Jay Thomas 
and that it be provided to the boys in a unified manner. It is in 
their best interest that the boys hear a consistent presentation 
regarding these issues. 
50. It is reasonable that the petitioner, respondent and 
intervenor be able to attend events for both boys and any of the 
three parties should be permitted to perform volunteer work in 
either of the boys' school classrooms. 
51. In the event that the parties are unable to facilitate a 
parenting plan or in the event that petitioner and Thanoses reach 
an impasse regarding major issues concerning the boys, it is 
reasonable that a parenting coordinator be utilized to facilitate 
resolution of parenting disagreements. Each party should pay one-
half of the cost of that coordinator. 
Child Support 
52. The intervener's income is approximately $11,747 gross 
per month. Petitioner's gross monthly income is $7,750 per month. 
Respondent's monthly gross income is $7,440. The combined adjusted 
gross incomes of petitioner and respondent exceeds the guidelines, 
therefore, the amount of child support is determined on a case by 
case basis and the Court must determine what is reasonable. 
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53. The current gross monthly incomes of petitioner and 
respondent are substantially the same. The standard of living 
currently enjoyed by petitioner and respondent is consistent with 
that which was enjoyed during the course of petitioner's and 
respondent's marriage, except currently respondent benefits from 
the income and earning capacity of intervenor. Petitioner and 
respondent's earning capacity is similar based upon their 
education, training and work experience. There is a seven year age 
difference between petitioner and respondent which does not impact 
their respective incomes or earning capacity. Based upon the joint 
physical custody arrangement or access schedule as to Nicholas, 
petitioner will have 182 overnights and respondent will have 183 
overnights, or vice versa. Based upon the foregoing, both 
petitioner and respondent each have adequate resources to 
adequately support Nicholas without child support from the other. 
Therefore, zero child support is awarded for either petitioner or 
respondent regarding Nicholas, which is reasonable under the facts 
set forth hereinbefore. Respondent and intervenor have agreed or 
the Court finds that petitioner should not be required to pay child 
support for Zachary. Petitioner's claim for retroactive child 
support is denied. 
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Medical, Dental Insurance/Daycare 
54. Through their employment the Thanoses are capable of 
obtaining medical and dental insurance for Nicholas and Zachary. 
They should be required to obtain such insurance. The Thanoses 
have agreed to pay all insurance expenses for Zachary. Petitioner 
should be ordered to reimburse them for one-half of the cost of 
obtaining such medical and dental insurance for Nicholas. The 
Thanoses should be ordered to provide petitioner with documentary 
proof that they have obtained medical and dental insurance coverage 
for Nicholas. Petitioner should be ordered to pay his one-half 
share of the premium for Nicholas' medical and dental insurance on 
the 5th day of each month beginning with the first month following 
his receipt from Thanoses of confirmation of the said medical and 
dental insurance coverage. 
55. Neither petitioner nor the Thanoses should be required to 
pay any daycare expenses incurred by the other party in the 
providing of care for the boys. 
56. Petitioner should be required to pay one-half of all 
medical or dental insurance co-pays or deductibles and one-half of 
all dental and medical expenses incurred by either petitioner or 
the Thanoses on behalf of or for the benefit of Nicholas. The 
Thanoses have agreed to pay all such expenses and all school 
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expenses incurred on behalf or for the benefit of Zachary. It is 
reasonable that they be required to pay all of such expenses. 
Alimony 
57. For the following reasons neither petitioner or 
respondent should be awarded alimony: 
a. The financial conditions of petitioner and 
respondent are similar. The standards of living of petitioner and 
respondent as of the date of their separation has not changed 
significantly. Neither will be required to accept a lower standard 
of living if he or she does not receive alimony from the other. 
b. The incomes of petitioner and respondent are nearly 
identical. Each has the ability to produce significant income in 
the future. 
c. Neither petitioner nor respondent directly 
contributed to any increase in the skill or earning capacity of the 
other during their marriage. 
d. Although respondent's affair with intervenor was a 
contributing cause of the disintegration of the marriage of 
petitioner and respondent, the ultimate cause of the termination of 
their marriage was their irreconcilable differences. The parties 
made a good faith effort to reconcile after respondent's affair 
with intervenor became known to petitioner. The Court is therefore 
of the view that fault should not be considered in the awarding of 
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alimony. As is often the case in marital relationships, the Court 
finds petitioner and respondent both responsible for the 
irreconcilable differences that ended their marriage. 
58. Petitioner and respondent have executed and filed with 
this Court a Stipulation which resolves all remaining differences 
between them concerning the division of their marital property. 
The Stipulation is reasonable and should be incorporated into this 
Courtf s Decree of Divorce. 
Contempt/Work-Related Child Care Expenses 
59. By a motion for an Order to Show Cause dated November 13, 
2003, petitioner asked this Court to hold respondent in contempt 
for her failure to reimburse him for certain expenses which he had 
incurred on behalf of Nicholas and Zachary. The motion was based 
upon an interim order entered by this Court on March 28, 2001, 
which required the parties equally to divide expenses related to 
the rearing of the boys. Following a hearing before Commissioner 
Michael S. Evans on January 22, 2004, the Commissioner recommended 
that respondent be held in contempt for her failure to reimburse 
petitioner and that this Court enter a judgment against respondent 
in the approximate sum of $12,000. Respondent objected to that 
recommendation. This Court determined that respondent's objection 
to the Commissioner's recommendation be heard at the trial of this 
matter. 
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60. At the time of trial petitioner and respondent informed 
the Court that they had reached an agreement with regard to the 
sums which each had paid before the trial for medical insurance and 
uninsured medical expenses. The parties stipulated that in the 
Decree the Court should award petitioner the sum of $1,911.41 
representing net expenditures by petitioner for medical insurance 
premiums and uninsured medical expenses after offsetting payments 
made by respondent for those categories of expenses. 
61. Petitioner and respondent were unable to reach an 
agreement concerning work-related childcare expenses incurred by 
each of them. The Court received evidence concerning those 
expenses and determined that prior to trial petitioner had incurred 
work-related childcare expenses of $8,811.20 and respondent had 
incurred work-related childcare expenses of $2,315.00. The net 
amount owing to petitioner is therefore $6,496.20. The Decree of 
Divorce should award petitioner that amount for pretrial work-
related childcare expenses. 
62. There is no evidence that respondent deliberately 
violated the interim order. At the time the Order to Show Cause 
was issued petitioner and respondent were communicating about the 
sums which each had expended for the boys. Respondent had 
requested additional financial information which petitioner had not 
provided. Respondent had potential offsets which she had not yet 
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computed or documented. Under the circumstances, holding 
respondent in contempt would be inappropriate. 
Attorney's Fees 
63. The attorney fees incurred by petitioner, respondent and 
intervenor are substantial and comparable in amount. Each party 
has the ability to pay their respective attorney fees based upon 
their annual incomes. Additionally, in a case of this nature and 
complexity, determining who is the prevailing party is next to 
impossible. Therefore, each party is required to assume 
responsibility for their respective attorney fees without 
contribution. 
Transition 
64. The fifty/fifty shared temporary custody arrangement 
shall continue until petitioner's anticipated relocation to Oregon. 
It is in the best interests of the minor children that petitioner, 
respondent and intervenor relocate to Oregon simultaneously in 
order to reduce any period of separation necessitated by the 
transition. In any event, respondent and intervener's relocation 
to Oregon must occur prior to Nicholas starting the school term in 
Oregon. 
Based upon the preceding Findings of Fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner and respondent are awarded joint legal custody 
of Nicholas. Respondent and intervenor are awarded joint legal 
custody of Zachary as further described in the Court's Findings. 
2. Respondent is designated the primary physical custodian 
of Nicholas. Respondent and intervenor are designated the primary 
physical custodians of Zachary. 
3. Petitioner should be awarded joint physical custody time 
with Nicholas and Zachary in the manner described in the Court's 
Findings. 
4. Petitioner and respondent should be ordered each to pay 
one-half of Nicholas1 uninsured medical and dental insurance 
premiums, co-pays and deductibles and one-half of the cost of 
health and dental insurance for him. Respondent and intervenor 
should be ordered to pay all such expenses of Zachary. 
5. None of the parties should be ordered to pay alimony or 
for the cost of work-related childcare. 
6. Respondent should be ordered to pay petitioner the sum of 
$6,496.20 as reimbursement for expenses incurred by him on behalf 
of Nicholas and Zachary for work-related childcare prior to the 
date of trial. 
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7. The property of petitioner and respondent should be 
divided according to the division described in their Stipulation 
for Property Division dated December 10, 2003. 
8. Respondent should not be held in contempt for failure to 
reimburse petitioner for childcare and medical expenses he incurred 
prior to November 13, 2003. 
9. The parties are ordered to share in thirds equally the 
costs of Dr. Sanders1 custody evaluation. 
10. Counsel for respondent and intervenor are instructed to 
submit a Decree consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this / / day of May, 2 0( 
lyux/ /^ 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
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